Crude oil prices: speculation versus fundamentals by Kolodziej, Marek Krzysztof
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2013





GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
Dissertation 
CRUDE OIL PRICES: SPECULATION VERSUS FUNDAMENTALS 
by 
MAREK KRZYSZTOF KOLODZIEJ 
B.Sc., University of Rhode Island, 2004 
M .A., Univers ity of Illinois, 2006 
Submitted in partial fulfillment ofthe 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2013 
© Copyright by 





Assistant Professor of Geography 
For my Parents. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First, I would like to thank Robert Kaufmann for his continual encouragement, 
econometric advice and friendship. The countless hours we spent discussing energy modeling, 
time series econometrics, and how to survive the stresses of a full-time job while completing the 
degree requirements will be fondly remembered . I will be forever indebted to him for his 
mentorship and wisdom. 
The completion of this work would have been impossible without Ian Sue Wing's 
support. The two years that I spent working for Ian as a research assistant funded by a U.S. DOE 
grant marked a period of incredible intellectual growth for me. Ian opened my eyes to the 
potential of operations research and optimization-based modeling, for which I will be eternally 
grateful. 
I would like to thank Nalin Kulatilaka for his financial theory insights, without which the 
econometric results found in this dissertation would have lacked a solid interpretation. 
I would like to express my gratitude for Dana Bauer' s and Cutler Cleveland ' s input into 
this work. I am also grateful for Dana' s resource economics mentorship over the course of my 
Ph.D. program, as well as for her emotional suppmt and faith in me in times of high stress. 
I would like to extend my thanks to Houston Stokes at the University of Illinois, who 
over the course of my Master' s program taught me most of the econometrics I know today, as 
well as to Doug Reynolds at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, who taught me a great deal 
about institutional issues pertaining to the oil and gas industry, and with whom I published three 
peer-reviewed papers. I am also indebted to Craig Schmidt, who taught me a lot of neat modeling 
v 
tricks that while not relevant to this dissertation, are very much relevant to my growth as a 
predictive analyst. 
Navigating the BU bureaucracy would have been impossible without the continued 
support from Chris DeVits and Christian Cole. Chris and Christian managed to transform 
Kafkaesque situations into Swiss clockwork many times, and he always did it with tons of good 
humor. 
I am deeply indebted to Swapnil Shah, Ken Kolkebeck and Badri Raghavan at FirstFuel 
Software for enabling me to put my skills to practical use. The ability to make a difference in the 
real world by deploying energy efficiency auditing technologies restored my enthusiasm for 
research and my motivation to complete the Ph.D. 
The quintessential Zen career advice is to "choose a job you love, and you will never 
have to work a day in your life." I would like to thank Stephen Harrison, Prakash Teli, Siddharth 
Kundalkar, and the entire India Team (especially Neerav Kulshreshtha, Basavaraj Kalloli , Sameer 
Khare, Shreyas Pai, Amit Dixit and Ameeth Paatil) for helping me discover a passion for both 
software engineering and computer science. 
I would like to thank my wonderful non-IT colleagues at FirstFuel Software, Tarik 
Borogovac, Indran Ratnathicam, John Tehrani, Domenic Armano, Dan Foley, Chris Tomasini, 
Cara Giudice, Janet Desaulniers and John MacPhee for making work both fun and fruitful. 
Life would have been meaningless and unbearable without true friendships. I would like 
to thank Marek Mroziewicz, Ewa Kozinska, Jagoda Gandziarowska, Anna Senkara, Michal 
Jedrzejewski, Ric. Mcintyre, Jim Starkey, Sally Honda, Dan Craig, Mike Mann, Jamie Baldwin, 
Britt Briber and many others for giving my life a purpose. 
Vl 
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, whose incredibly hard work, sacrifice, and 
unconditional love words simply cannot begin to describe. I hope that you feel as loved back as I 
feel loved by you. 
Vll 
CRUDE OIL PRICES: SPECULATION VERSUS FUNDAMENTALS 
(Order No. ) 
MAREK KRZYSZTOF KOLODZIEJ 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2013 
Major Professor: Robert K. Kaufmann, Professor of Earth and Environment 
ABSTRACT 
Beginning in 2004, the price of crude oil fluctuates rapidly over a wide range. Large and 
rapid pnce increases have recessionary consequences and dampen long-term infrastructural 
investment. 
speculation. 
investigate whether pnce changes are driven by market fundamentals or 
With regard to market fundamentals, I revisit econometric evidence for the importance of 
demand shocks, as proxied by dry maritime cargo rates, on oil prices. When I eliminate 
transportation costs from both sides of the equation, disaggregate OPEC and non-OPEC 
production, and allow for more than one cointegrating relation, I find that previous specifications 
are inconsistent with arguments that demand shocks play an important role. Instead, results 
confirm the importance of OPEC supply shocks. 
I investigate two channels by which speculation may affect oil prices; the direct effect of 
trader behavior and changes in oil from a commodity to a financial asset. With regard to trader 
behavior, I find evidence that trader positions are required to explain the spread between spot and 
futures prices of crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The inclusion of trader 
Vlll 
positions clarifies the process of equilibrium error correction, such that there is bidirectional 
causality between prices and trader positions. This creates the possibility of speculative bubbles. 
With regard to oil as a commodity and/or financial asset, I use a Kalman Filter model to 
estimate the time-varying partial correlation between returns to investments in equity and oil 
markets. This correlation changes from negative to positive at the onset of the 2008 financial 
crisis. The low interest rates used to rescue the economy depress convenience yields, which 
reduces the benefits of holding oil as a commodity . Instead, oil becomes a financial asset (on net) 
as the oil market changed from contango to backwardation. 
Contradicting simple political narratives, my research suggests that both market 
fundamentals and speculation drive large oil prices. Chinese oil demand is not responsible for 
large increases in oil prices; nor are they caused by behavioral idiosyncrasies by oil traders. 
Finally, oil will be treated largely as a financial asset so long as interest rates are held near their 
all-time lows. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 2004, the price of crude oil fluctuates rapidly over a wide range. From $60 
per barrel in 2004, the price for the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil peaks at $148 in 
July 2008. Only six months later, the price drops under $40. In January 2012, the price moves 
beyond $100, and in July 2012, it drops below $80. Large and rapid price increases may have 
negative macroeconomic consequences (Hamilton, 1983 ; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Mork et 
a/. , 1994; Cufiado and Perez de Garcia, 2003; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). Just as 
importantly, growing volatility itself introduces considerable uncertainty that complicates 
infrastructural planning and thereby dampens long-term investment and aggregate demand 
(Lilien, 1982; Bernanke, 1983; Hamilton, 1988; Ferderer, 1996). 
Despite the considerable secular increase in both the level and volatility of the price of oil 
in the past decade, many fundamental questions regarding the source of these changes remain 
unanswered. Are market fundamentals (strong global aggregate demand) or speculation the 
driving force behind the secular increase in the price of oil between 2004 and 2008? Does the 
source of the fundamental-driven price changes (supply, aggregate demand, oil-market-specific 
precautionary demand) affect the macroeconomic outcomes and the timing of the dynamic 
adjustment to the back to equilibrium? Is speculation the cause of increased volatility? Do trader 
positions in the oil futures market affect oil prices, or is the speculative component associated 
with an optimal portfolio allocation strategy, in which money between from equity and 
commodity markets? 
Kaufmann (20 11) argues that speculation plays a significant role in the 2008/2009 price 
spike and collapse based on three changes: (1) a significant increase in private crude oil 
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inventories, (2) a breakdown in the cointegrating relationship between spot and far month futures 
prices that is inconsistent with arbitrage opportunities, and (3) predictive failures by an 
econometric model of oil prices that is based on economic fundamentals. Masters (2008) finds 
that non-commercial traders now buy and sell oil as a financial asset, and Medlock and Jaffe 
(2009) note that non-commercial traders now hold about 50 percent of oil futures positions, and 
that this percentage grows steadily in recent times. If speculators act as fully informed 
participants (in the rational expectations/efficient market sense), then their role may be benign 
(Weiner, 2002). However, when they take an extrapolative strategy or if herding or contagion 
occurs, their presence in the market can amplify volatility. Cifarelli and Paladino (20 I 0) find 
evidence for the latter scenario to be consistent with reality over the past several years. 
However, many of these studies are merely suggestive. In order to quantifY the role of 
speculators, I need to examine the role of trader positions on spot and futures oil prices, both in 
the long and the short run. One aspect of such an analysis would be to see whether trader 
positions Granger-cause oil prices, whether the causality goes in the opposite direction, or 
whether there is evidence for bidirectional causality. Studies that have been published to date that 
examine this issue indicate that trader positions do not Granger-cause oil prices, however they are 
limited by several difficulties. First, they ignore the presence of unit roots in the data, thereby 
allowing for a high probability of spurious regressions (Granger and Newbold, 1974). Second, 
even if these regressions are not spurious, using an econometric technique that does not account 
for cointegration and error correction (such as a vector autoregression) generates a misspecified 
model , per the Granger Representation Theorem (Granger and Lee, 1990). Therefore, the 
conclusions of these studies are likely biased. Another problem with the studies that had been 
done to date is omitted variable bias- a bivariate vector autoregression or a distributed lag model 
lacks many other explanatory variables that should be part of the information set. These 
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omissions may bias the point estimates of the included variables if they are correlated with the 
missing variables. This biases F statistics that are used to test for Granger causality. Furthermore, 
models with omitted variables have correlated residuals, which again invalidates econometric 
inference used to determine Granger causality. Therefore, it seems that the existing literature is 
inconclusive, and could benefit from better econometric specifications to improve inference. In 
this dissertation, I examine the evidence for causality among oil prices and trader positions, and I 
find evidence for bidirectional causality, which is at odds with the existing literature which finds 
no causality from trader positions to oil prices, and therefore no evidence for the influence of 
speculation on the price discovery process. The separation of commercial and non-commercial 
positions, as well as the inclusion of oil inventories and of spot and futures prices provides a 
richer information set that generates cointegrating relationships, and is thereby sound from an 
econometric point of view. Furthermore, a cointegrated vector autoregression (CV AR) model 
allows me to separate the short- and long-run impacts, resulting in a more informative analysis. 
Another issue that has not been explored in depth is the dynamic evolution of the 
potential influence of speculation on the price discovery process. The cointegrated vector 
autoregression finds cointegration for the entire period spanned by the dataset, however this may 
be misleading if there are brief (but potentially substantively significant) changes in the 
relationship between the variables. Rolling window correlations between U.S. stock market 
returns and the returns on commodities show a strong regime change in 2007, which coincides 
with the full automation of U.S . stock exchange trading in September 2007, and hence an increase 
in the influence of high-frequency and algorithmic trading. Even if one examines the E-mini 
S&P500 index (which was always fully electronic) as opposed to the standard S&P500 index, 
dramatic changes that start in 2007. For instance, the number of trades on the E-mini S&P500 
\ncrease from 8 million to II million between 2001 and 2004, and is stable at about 1 1 million 
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until 2006. However, the number of trades doubled to 22 million in 2007, more than doubled the 
following year to 49 million, and subsequently doubled again to 107 million in 2010. A parallel 
change occurs in oil markets, where the number of trades of WTI on NYMEX increases from 485 
thousand in 2001 to 920 thousand in 2005 , to 12 million in 2007 and to 42 million in 2011 
(Bicchetti and Maystre, 2012, in press). Consistent with these parallel changes, Bicchetti and 
Maystre identify a large regime change that took place in 2007 in terms of significantly increased 
correlations between stock and commodity market returns, using hourly, 5-minute, I 0-second and 
1-second data. At such high frequencies, economic fundamentals become irrelevant because 
industrial production is reported monthly, GOP is reported quarterly, and even oil inventories are 
reported weekly. Therefore, if there exists a high correlation between stock market and 
commodity market (e.g. oil price) returns, one may conclude that commodities have become but 
one more asset in the market players' optimal portfolio allocation strategy. The U.S. Energy 
Information Administration reaches similar conclusions (EIA, 2012). 
The issue with Bicchetti and Maystre's analysis is that correlations are likely biased due 
to omitted variables. If there are other factors that are correlated with one of the variables in the 
simple bivariate correlation, then the estimate of the correlation will be biased by the lack of the 
omitted variable(s). Estimating a multivariate regression gives partial correlations associated with 
the variables in question, given the conditioning set of the other variables in the model. If the 
information set is complete, these partial correlations will be unbiased. The second issue with 
Bicchetti and Maystre's analysis is that they look at arbitrary subperiods to determine the 
changing correlations. In my research, I use the Kalman filter to determine the statistically 
optimal state variable (regression coefficient) variances, and hence the optimal "memory" of the 
coefficients' histories. This will also allow me to estimate the time-varying standard errors for 
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these coefficients, and hence the time-varying statistical significance of the variables m the 
model. 
Besides speculation, the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals in the oil pnce 
discovery process merits further investigation. As I mentioned above, there exists a very rich 
literature that identifies and measures the negative macroeconomic effects of oil price increases. 
This literature starts in 1983 with Hamilton's seminal paper, and continues to grow through the 
present day (e.g. Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). However, more recent studies point to 
the fact that the measurement of the influence of oil prices on aggregate demand may be biased 
due to model misspecification, because the approach taken to date implicitly assumes that oil 
prices are exogenous . In reality, oil prices are determined not only by speculation and political 
events, but also, and hopefully by supply and demand conditions in the oil market. Treating oil 
price changes exclusively as supply shocks is not realistic, because both supply and demand 
determine the equilibrium price. Precluding the influence of demand shocks involves assuming a 
completely stationary demand curve. Ignoring the influence of aggregate demand on oil prices 
and attributing oil price changes to pure supply shocks does not seem sensible. In addition to oil 
supply and demand, there exists an unobservable precautionary demand component, which may 
influence oil prices in a different way and with a different dynamic. Several papers describe this 
topic (Barsky and Kilian, 2002; Hamilton, 2003 ; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Rotemberg 2007). It 
was not until Kilian's 2009 paper that this hypothesis is analyzed in a formal econometric manner. 
Kilian (2009) estimates a monthly model of oil production, oil prices, as well as a dry-bulk 
maritime shipping index (as a proxy for global aggregate demand). Kilian's findings seem to 
undermine the findings of the supply-centered literature of the past three decades. Kilian 
concludes that supply shocks have a negative macroeconomic effect but that it is small and 
transitory , while the effects of aggregate demand are positive despite the higher oil prices (since 
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they stem from high aggregate demand), and they are long lasting. Furthermore, increases in 
precautionary demand have a negative macroeconomic effect that is larger and more long-lasting 
than that generated by supply shocks. 
Kilian's research sheds light on the importance of separating supply and demand factors 
when analyzing the sources and consequences of oil price shocks, however his model suffers 
from many shortcomings. First, the variables have unit roots, so estimating a vector 
autoregression (VAR) may result in spurious regressions and divergent impulse response 
functions at worst, or in very long lags and serious residual autocorrelation and biased inference 
at best. l will use a cointegrated vector autoregressive (CV AR) model to address these issues. 
Kilian also uses an aggregate measure of oil production, but different production-setting 
strategies make the relative contributions of OPEC and non-OPEC to the overall supply stream 
important (Kaufmann et al. , 2004; Smith, 2005). In particular, I find OPEC oil production to be 
exogenous to the model (though influencing the other variables), with non-OPEC production 
adjusting to changes in prices and other factors. This is consistent with the widely held view that 
non-OPEC producers try to maximize the net present value of their resources, while OPEC 
producers have political and other motives driving production changes. In a static model, the 
separation of the oil supply streams would be less important, however in a dynamic model such 
as a CVAR, this separation allows me to identifY multiple cointegrating relations, short-run 
adjustment parameters, weak exogeneity, etc. Also, Kilian uses a potentially poor measure of oil 
prices - his measure, the refiner's acquisition cost, includes tariffs, wharfage, demurrage, and 
other costs that cause this price to diverge from the wellhead price. Moreover, refiner's 
acquisition cost includes the cost of maritime transportation, thereby resulting in the inclusion of 
transportation costs on both sides of some of Kilian's V AR equations. By using a the free-on-
board (FOB) oil price that does not include these distortions, I will attempt to identifY a more 
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accurate relationship between the variables. Kilian also includes all variables except for oil 
production in levels in his V AR, with oil production specified in first differences. He does not 
explain why this mix of levels and first differences was chosen, but it would seem reasonable for 
all the variables to be either consistently in levels or first differences. Given that oil production 
has a unit root just like the other variables, including it in first differences precludes cointegration 
and creates a possibility of a spurious regression. I will estimate my model consistently in levels 
in the cointegrating vectors, and in first differences in the short-run parameters, which is how the 
CVAR methodology is supposed to work (Juselius, 2006). Finally, given the use of a VAR with 
variables containing unit roots, Kilian predictably uses long lags due to strong residual 
autocorrelation (which may even be indicative of a spurious regression). He chose the lag length 
of twenty four, i.e. of exactly two years' worth of lags. This seems to be a strange coincidence, 
given that lag length should be chosen based on a trade-off between fit, loss of degrees of 
freedom, and the statistical significance of the lagged variables. I will use a lag selection scheme 
such as the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion and Hannan-Quinn Criterion to choose an optimal lag 
length. All these considerations and modifications to Kilian's model will allow me to determine 
how robust his model is to an alternative specification that is consistent with econometric theory. 
As described in chapter 2, the improved specification supports the existing supply-shock 
literature more so than Kilian's own findings. 
What is the practical importance of this research? Specifically, are there potential policy 
implications of these findings? In order to answer this question, one has to distinguish between oil 
price shocks driven by economic fundamentals from those caused by speculation. In the case of 
macroeconomic fundamentals, one needs to make a further distinction between supply and 
demand shocks. If high prices are driven by positive demand shocks, there would not be a need 
for intervention because any recessionary effect of high oil prices would bring the economy back 
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towards a secular trend since it was already performing above the trend (booming). Negative 
demand shocks cause prices to fall , so there would not be a negative macroeconomic 
consequence of a negative oil demand shock. On the supply side, a negative supply shock, e.g. 
caused by military conflicts or OPEC production quota changes, could have unfavorable 
economic consequences, and there may be policy implications of the finding that such shocks 
matter. For instance, frequent and large supply shocks might call for higher inventory levels in 
consuming nations, beyond what profit-maximizing oil distributors would be willing to store. A 
case in point is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) maintained by the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Focusing on speculation, one needs to distinguish benign from harmful speculation, and 
oil-market-specific speculation from cross-market capital flows due to portfolio optimization. As 
I mentioned above, oil-market-specific speculation consistent with the rational expectations 
hypothesis is harmless because prices do not consistently diverge from the valuation dictated by 
market fundamentals in such a situation. This kind of harmless speculation is actually beneficial, 
because it provides liquidity needed by the hedgers, who use the futures markets to guarantee 
prices at some future point in time. On the other hand, speculation that causes divergence of the 
price of oil away from market fundamentals , e.g. due to market bubbles, would be considered 
harmful and reducing market efficiency, and may call for government intervention if the expected 
costs of such intervention are lower than the expected benefits. Finally, speculative activity 
associated with cross-market capital flows, e.g. between the equity and commodity markets, can 
be considered harmless or even beneficial if it leads to risk reduction due to portfolio 
optimization consistent with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). If cross-market capital 
flows cause price divergence away from the balanced portfolio predictions of the CAPM, then 
this kind of speculative activity can be seen as inefficient and calling for intervention provided 
that the cost-benefit analysis indicates a net benefit of the proposed intervention. All in all, the 
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identification of the source of the large increase in the level and volatility of the price of oil has 
clear policy implications. 
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2. OIL DEMAND SHOCKS RECONSIDERED: A COINTEGRATED VECTOR 
AUTOREGRESSION 
2.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis that large, abrupt increases in real oil prices contribute to recessions can be 
traced back to a seminal paper by Hamilton ( 1983). Since then, many studies corroborate the 
adverse macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks (e.g. Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; 
Mark et al. , 1994; Cufiado and Perez de Garcia, 2003 ; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). 
Much of this literature implicitly assumes that oil price shocks originate from exogenous supply-
side disruptions. More recent studies explore the possibility that these shocks stem not only from 
shifts in supply, but also shifts in demand. Although this strand of the literature is fairly new, 
there are theoretical arguments and descriptive historical accounts that support this view (e.g. 
Barsky and Kilian, 2002; Hamilton, 2003 ; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Rotemberg, 2007). 
To support arguments for the importance of demand-side oil price shocks, Kilian (2009) 
estimates a vector autoregressive (V AR) model that specifies the first difference of global oil 
production, real oil prices, and an index for dry bulk maritime freight costs (used to proxy 
macroeconomic activity/non-precautionary oil demand). A structural decomposition of the V AR 
disaggregates oil price shocks into oil supply, global aggregate demand, and oil market-specific, 
precautionary demand shocks, which are related to changing expectations about future supply. 
Impulse response functions indicate that the source of an oil price shock has important 
implications for both its macroeconomic impact and the dynamic response. During the 1973-2007 
sample period, aggregate and oil market-specific demand shocks cause persistent and large oil 
price increases, while oil supply shocks generate small and transitory price increases. Moreover, 
1 1 
while oil market-specific demand and supply shocks have a negative impact on economtc 
activity, the evidence for aggregate demand shocks is mixed, and depends on the time horizon. 
Together, Kilian 's findings imply that oil price shocks, which result from robust global aggregate 
demand, are not a cause for concem because the high price of oil dampens the global economy 
when it is already performing well above the secular trend, while oil supply shocks are not an 
issue due to their transitory and minor impact. Therefore, the real concem is oil market-specific 
demand shocks, which are associated with changes in expectations about future oil supply. 
This paper recognizes the advantages of disaggregating oil shocks into supply, oil market-
specific demand, and aggregate demand shocks, but evaluates the degree to which Kilian ' s 
findings about this disaggregation are robust. To do so, I estimate cointegrating vector 
autoregression (CVAR) models that explore four aspects of Kilian's specification. First, Kilian 
(2009) uses dry bulk maritime freight costs as a proxy for global economic activity and/or non-
precautionary oil demand. There is little evidence for such a wide-ranging interpretation of dry 
bulk maritime freight costs. For example, Kaufmann (20 11) finds that there is no statistically 
measurable relation between dry bulk maritime freight costs and oil consumption during the 
1968-2008 the sample period. The lack of a relation begs the question, do dry cargo bulk 
maritime freight rates represent anything beyond transportation costs? 
The interpretation of dry bulk maritime freight costs is critical because the measure of oil 
prices used by Kilian (2009), the refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, includes 
transportation costs (and wharfage, tariffs, and other charges). Put simply, measuring oil prices 
with the refiner acquisition cost puts transportation costs on both sides of the regression equations 
and therefore creates a priori a positive relationship between the refiner acquisition cost and dry 
bulk maritime freight costs. The second aspect of my analysis investigates this effect (and effects 
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of including the costs of wharfage, tariffs, and other charges that may blur the connection 
between oil prices and economic activity), by estimating a model that measures oil prices with a 
free-on-board (FOB) price, which excludes transportation costs, as well as wharfage, demurrage, 
and tariffs. 
Third, Kilian (2009) specifies oil supply as the first difference of a single aggregate of OPEC 
and non-OPEC production. But this aggregation may be inappropriate because OPEC and 
nonOPEC nations use different criteria to set production levels. Specifically, OPEC nations use 
strategic behavior (in part) to set production levels (e.g. Smith, 2005) while oil output in most 
non-OPEC countries is based primarily on economic considerations (e.g. Kaufmann et al., 2004). 
Given these fundamental differences, aggregating global oil supply into OPEC and non-OPEC 
sources may obfuscate the importance of supply-side shocks. To investigate this effect, I estimate 
a model that specifies OPEC and non-OPEC production separately. 
Fourth, Kilian's VAR specification includes a log of his detrended shipping index, a log of 
refiner acquisition cost deflated using the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), and the first 
difference of the log of global oil production. Kilian (2009) does not explain why oil production 
is specified using its (logged) first difference, as opposed to its level. Because univariate and 
multivariate tests suggest that the crude oil price and shipping cost time series are I(l) (see below) 
and the first difference of oil production is 1(0), specifying the first difference of global oil 
production eliminates any long-run relation between oil production and oil prices and/or the 
shipping index a priori. As such, specifying the first difference of production reduces the possible 
impacts of supply side shocks. To investigate this effect, I estimate a model that specifies the 
level of OPEC and non-OPEC production (separately). 
To evaluate the effect of these four issues on the results generated by Kilian (2009) I estimate 
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a four variable system using a cointegrated vector autoregression (CV AR) model. I use this 
methodology because it is designed for non-stationary time series, it explicitly represents 
cointegration and error correction, it can identity more than one cointergating relation, and it can 
be used to explicitly test whether time series are endogenous/exogenous. As such, it represents a 
viable alternative to the vector autoregression used by Kilian (2009). 
The results ofthe four variable CVAR model are largely inconsistent with those generated by 
Kilan (2009). In summary, the results suggest that OPEC and non-OPEC nations use different 
criteria to set production levels and that changes in OPEC production have significant price 
effects that are commonly associated with price shocks. There is a relation between oil prices and 
dry bulk maritime freight costs, but the loadings of the co integrating relations and simulations of 
the system' s dynamics suggest that this relation simply represent the effect of higher oil prices on 
transportation costs. Sensitivity analyses suggest that the differences in the results reported here 
and by Kilian (2009) are caused by including transportation costs in the measure of oil prices, 
aggregating OPEC and non-OPEC production, and using a very long lag length to estimate the 
VAR. 
These results and the methods used to obtain them are described in five sections. In section 
2, I describe the data and methodology used to estimate a CV AR model of the long- and short 
run-relations among oil prices, the index for dry bulk maritime shipping costs, OPEC oil 
production, and non-OPEC oil production. The classification of the variables as endogenous or 
exogenous, the number of cointegrating relations, and their make-up is described in section 3. 
Section 4 describes the cointegrating relations and interprets their meaning based on simulations 
that explore the dynamics of perturbations to oil prices, oil production, and dry bulk maritime 
freight costs. Section 5 concludes by arguing that the empirical evidence currently available is 
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consistent with the large literature that describes the importance of supply shocks on oil prices. 
2.2. Methodology 
2. 2.1 Data 
Kilian ' s index for dry cargo bulk freight rates (SHIP) is obtained from the data set submitted 
by Kilian along with his paper to the American Economic Review' . (Logged) values for global 
monthly oil production by OPEC (OPEC) and non-OPEC nations (NOPEC) are obtained from 
the U.S . Energy Information Administration (EIA). The U.S. monthly, seasonally-adjusted 
consumer price index for all urban consumers and all items, published by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, is obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data database2 . Monthly 
observations for the free-on-board (FOB) price of crude oil imported into the United States are 
obtained from the US EIA. These values are deflated using the CPI, logged, and used as the 
measure for real oil prices (PRICE) . All data series are available for the period over which Kilian 
estimates his original model , i.e. January 1973 through November 2007. The CPI series is used 
as-is, i.e. with the index centered on I 00 for the years 1982-19843. Each time series is normalized 
by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation to ease the interpretation of 
regression coefficients and to improve the numeric precision of floating-point calculations. 
The time series properties of the four time series is determined using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller statistic (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; Said and Dickey, 1984). The lag length is chosen using 
1 Data found in the ZIP file located at 
http: //www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june09/20070211 _ data.zip. See Kilian (2009) for a detailed 
discussion of the contruction of hi index. 
2 http:/research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIA U C SL ?cid=9. 
3 http:/stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm 
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the Akaike Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974) to evaluate up to eight lags, which is based on 
the usual metric T 113, where T represents the number of time series observations. Results indicate 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected for any time series at any ofthe conventional 
significance levels (I-I 0%). These results are not sensitive to the lag length used. These results 
also are consistent with multivariate tests of stationarity (with two cointegrating relations-see 
below), which strongly reject (p < .000) the null hypothesis of stationarity, except for non-OPEC 
production (p < 0.13 ). Together, these results strongly suggest that the time series are I( I). 
2.2.2 Statistical Methodology 
To address the presence of stochastic trends in the data (and hence cointegration and error 
correction), to determine which variables are exogenous and endogenous, and to identify more 
than one cointegrating relation (if present), I use a co integrated vector autoregressive (CV AR) 
model (instead of a V AR) to analyze the relation among dry cargo bulk maritime freight rates 
(SHIP), non-OPEC production (NOPEC), OPEC production (OPEC), and the real price of crude 
oil (PRICE). The cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) time-series model is discussed in 
detail by Juselius (2006). Unlike the traditional vector error con·ection model (VECM), the 
CVAR allows for the presence of more than one linear combination of non-stationary variables 
that is stationary, i.e. multiple cointegrating relations. Each cointegrating relation has its own set 
of variable coefficients (cointegrating vector) that generates a stationary linear combination of 
variables present in the particular cointegrating relation . A CVAR with two lags (I lagged first 
difference per variable) can be concisely specified as follows: 
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in which x1 is a vector of variables whose behavior is being modeled endogenously, w1 is a vector 
of exogenous variables, r,, I1, A0, A, are matrices of regression coefficients, ~ is the first 
difference operator (~I = x, - x,_,) and £, : Niid(O, n). 
When the time series are nonstationary, the long-run matrix can be formulated as: 
II= ajJ' (2.2) 
in which a is a p x r matrix of adjustment coefficients (also known as loadings) and J3' is an 
r x p matrix of cointegrating vector coefficients. The term II.xt-1 represents the error correction 
mechanism (ECM). The number of co integrating relations present is given by the rank (r) of TI . 
2.3 Results 
I select the lag length using two statistical criteria, the multivariate Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) 
and the Hannan-Quinn criteria (Dennis eta/., 2005; Juselius, 2006). Starting with a maximum lag 
length of eight ( T 113 ), both criteria indicate that two lags is optimal. A value of two lags implies 
that there will be one lagged first difference per variable per equation (in addition to the error 
correction mechanism) because the CVAR model is based on first differences. The optimal lag 
length of two stands in sharp contrast with the twenty-four lags specified in the V AR estimated 
by Kilian (2009). The effect of specifying twenty-four lags is explored in section 4. 
Because there can be more than one cointegrating relation, the number of cointegrating 
relations (rank of ll) is determined empirically by calculating the A 1race statistic for every 
possible cointegrating rank (see Juselius (2006) for more information). The Atrace statistics 
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indicate that the CV AR model contains two cointegrating relations and two common stochastic 
trends. 
After choosing the rank, additional testing IS done to determine whether variables are 
endogenous or weakly exogenous. By weakly exogenous, I mean that a variable does not 
respond to disequilibria in the two cointegrating relations. To evaluate whether a variable is 
weakly exogenous and therefore can be excluded from the x vector in equation 2.1, I test 
restrictions that make all elements of a associated with an individual equation equal to zero. I 
reject restrictions that make PRICE ( x\2) = 6.7, p < 0.037), NOPEC ( X 2 (2) = 27.7, p < 
0.000), or SHIP ( x 2 (2) = 23.7, p < 0.000) weakly exogenous. Conversely, I fail to reject 
( X 2 (2) = 2.81, p > 0.24) a restriction that makes OPEC weakly exogenous. Furthermore, the 
relevant elements of the A matrices indicate that OPEC oil production does not respond to 
changes in the first differences of the other variables in a statistically significant manner, which 
suggests that OPEC is strongly exogenous. Based on these results, OPEC is transferred from the 
x to the w vector4 . In addition to explicitly testing for exogeneity, reducing the number of 
endogenous variables improves the efficiency of identifYing the long-run structure of a CV AR 
(Greenslade et al., 2002). 
Next I identifY the cointegrating relations by imposing overidentifYing restrictions on the 
cointegrating vectors. I fail to reject (X\1)= 0.73, p > 0.40) restrictions that eliminate NOPEC 
in the first cointegrating relation and eliminate SHIP and OPEC in the second cointegrating 
relation. Any additional restriction is rejected at p < .05. 
4 Keeping OPEC in x does not significantly change the results reported below 
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2.4 Discussion 
2. 4.1 Base Case 
The first cointegrating relation indicates a positive long-run relation between real oil prices 
and oil production by non-OPEC nations (Table 2.1 ). The positive relation suggests a supply 
relationship. This suggestion is consistent with the relevant elements of a. If the first 
cointegrating relation is normalized such that /]11 = 1.0, the value of a 11 = -0.0 I 0. This indicates 
that non-OPEC production adjusts to real oil prices, albeit very slowly. Conversely, the value of 
a 13 is not statistically different from zero, which indicates that price does not adjust to 
disequilibrium in the first cointegrating relation. Furthermore, [ 31 is not statistically different 
from zero (Table 2.2), which indicates that prices do not adjust to changes in the first difference 
of non-OPEC production. Together, these results indicate that non-OPEC oil production does not 
have a direct short- or long-run effect on oil prices, which is consistent with the widely accepted 
hypothesis that non-OPEC producers are price takers. 
The second cointegrating relation includes dry bulk maritime freight costs (SHIP) , the real 
price of oil (PRICE), OPEC production (OPEC), and a constant. The meaning of the second 
cointegrating relation and what SHIP represents therein is open to competing interpretations. The 
positive long-run relation between dry bulk maritime freight costs (SHIP) and the real price of oil 
(PRICE) is consistent with the hypothesis that SHIP represents oil demand and that demand 
shocks raise oil prices. Conversely, the positive relation is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
SHIP represents oil demand and/or macroeconomic activity because higher oil prices should not 
raise oil demand and/or economic activity. The negative relation between OPEC production and 
prices is consistent with the notion of supply shocks. The positive relation between OPEC 
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production and the shipping index suggests that higher rates of OPEC production increase the 
cost of shipping oil in particular and transportation costs (i .e. the dry freight cost-of-shipping 
index) in general. 
I evaluate these competing interpretations by examining the way in which the second 
cointegrating relation loads (elements of a) into the equations for MHIP and MRICE (Table 
2.1 ). ff I normalize the second cointegrating relation by SHIP, a22 is -0 .062. The negative sign 
indicates that disequilibrium in the first cointegrating relation moves SHIP towards the 
equilibrium value implied by that cointegrating relation. This equilibrium value can be calculated 
by solving the second cointegrating relation for SHIP as follows: 
SHIP1_1 = 0.842PRICE1_1 + 0.4220PEC1_1 + 0.393 (2.3) 
The positive coefficient associated with PRICE indicates that higher oil prices increase the 
cost of shipping non-energy goods, such as "grain, oilseeds, coal, iron ore, fertilizer, and scrap 
metal" (Kilian 2009, p. I 056), which Kilian (2009) uses to construct the shipping index. As such, 
this loading is consistent with the hypothesis that SHIP simply represents transportation costs. 
This interpretation is boolstered by the positive value (0.151) of r 23 which represents the short-
term effects of oil prices on shipping costs. For example, the USDA (2005) finds a very strong 
correlation between bunker adjustment surcharges for agricultural containers and lagged values of 
world oil prices. Together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that SHIP is nothing 
more than a measure of transportation costs and that its positive relation with oil prices simply 
represents the effect of oil prices on the cost of moving freight. 
Equation 2.3 also indicates that higher rates of OPEC production increase the cost of shipping 
non-energy goods. This effect is amplified by the positive coefficient (0.1 06) of A 1 that is 
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associated with the Jagged first difference of OPEC production in the SHIP equation (Table 2.3 ). 
Together, these positive relations may represent the effect of increasing OPEC oil shipments in 
particular on shipping costs in general , perhaps by increasing demand for bunker fuels. 
Disequilibrium in the second cointegrating relation also loads into the equation for oil prices 
such that the price of oil adjusts to the long-run value implied by the second cointegrating 
relation, which can be calculated by normalizing the second cointegrating relation by the element 
associated with PRICE and solving for PRICE as follows: 
PRICE1.1 = 1.34SH/P1. J- 0.567 * OPEC1. 1 + 0.527 (2.4) 
The positive coefficient associated with SHIP is consistent with the hypothesis that dry bulk 
maritime freight costs represent oi I demand and that demand shocks have a positive long-run 
effect on real oil prices. Lastly, the negative coefficient associated with OPEC is consistent with 
the notion that OPEC supply shocks have a negative effect on prices-higher rates of OPEC 
production reduce prices as they did in 1986 and lower rates of OPEC production increase prices 
as they did in the 1970' s and 1980's. 
Because the elements of a, jJ, rl, Ao, and AI do not generate unambiguous results regarding 
the interpretation of SHIP and its positive relation with oil prices, I simulate the impulse response 
functions that are generated by a structural MA version of the identified CV AR model. The 
structural MA model is specified to match the ordering imposed by Kilian (2009) on the VAR. 
Specifically, the ordering is such that oil prices respond to all shocks while non-OPEC production 
does not respond to the permanent shock. 
The CV AR contains two co integrating relations and one weakly exogenous variable (OPEC), 
therefore, model contains two endogenous stochastic trends, which correspond to transitory 
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shocks, and one exogenous stochastic trend, which corresponds to a single permanent shock. The 
first transitory shock has the greatest immediate effect on non-OPEC production (blue line), 
increasing output by 0.06 standard deviations, while reducing oil prices (PRICE, green line) by 
0.016 and transportation costs (SHIP, red line) by 0.009 (Figure 2.1 ). Given the magnitude and 
sign of these effects and the way in which the effects of the transitory shock fade, I interpret the 
first transitory shock as a non-price induced non-OPEC supply shock5• This shock has the 
immediate effect of increasing non-OPEC production, which generates smaller reductions in the 
well-head price of oil, and these reductions have an even smaller effect on transportation costs. 
Both of these effects fade over time as the shock to non-OPEC production declines. 
The second transitory shock has the greatest immediate effect on the shipping index, 
increasing transportation costs by .15 standard deviations (red line, Figure 2.2). At the same time, 
the second transitory shock reduces oil prices (PRICE, green line) by 0.05 standard deviations. 
There is no immediate effect on non-OPEC production. Given the magnitude and sign of these 
effects, I interpret the second transitory shock as a shock to transportation costs. Consistent with 
this interpretation, the negative relation between shipping costs and the FOB price of oil 
represents the degree to which a change in transportation costs is passed on refiners, who buy 
crude oil. Ceteris paribus, an increase in transportation costs raises the price of crude oil to 
refiners. This is the positive relation between the transportation costs and the refiners acquisition 
cost that Kilian (2009) interprets as the price increasing effect of a demand shock. 
But I measure crude oil prices with the FOB price of crude oil. Using this measure, I expect a 
negative relation between transportation costs and FOB prices if changes in transportation costs 
5 Non-OPEC production changes for reasons not related to price. For example, Russian output 
declines due to the collapse of the Former Soviet Union and starts to rise again once property 
relations are reestablished . 
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are not fully passed to refiners. Under these circumstances, oil producers will bear some of the 
increase in transportation costs, and this will reduce their net price, as measured by the FOB 
price. 
The degree to which increases in transportation costs are borne by producers is analogous to 
the differential incidence of energy taxes on energy prices. Empirical analyses indicate that the 
portion of gasoline or diesel taxes appear in the consumer price depends in part on capacity 
(Marion and Muehlegger, 20 II). Similarly, oil refiners may bear only a portion of unanticipated 
increase in transportation costs. The rest is borne by oil producers, which has the effect of 
reducing the net (FOB) price that is received by energy producers. 
The permanent shock has its greatest immediate effect on oil prices 0.11 (green line, Figure 
2.3), with a lesser positive effect on shipping costs 0.09 (red line) and non-OPEC production 
0.007 (blue line). Given the magnitude and sign of these effects, I interpret the permanent shock 
as a shock to oil prices (a so-called price shock). According to this interpretation, unanticipated 
increases in oil prices raise transportation costs via transportation fuel charges. This 
interpretation is consistent with the pattern by which prices and shipping costs decline after their 
respective peaks. Transportation costs start their decline sooner and the decline in transportation 
costs is faster than oil prices. The increase in oil prices will slow economic activity, and this will 
slow shipping activity. The reduction in shipping activity will slowly reduce the transportation 
costs. Nonetheless, transportation costs remain high because oil prices remain high . That is, a 
permanent increase in oil prices generates a permanent increase in transportation costs because oil 
prices are a large component of shipping costs. As described by Btiytik~ahin et al. (2008): "at 
typical 2005 (mid 2008) charter rates, the bunker fuel used to propel ships accounted for 
approximately one third (one half) of dry-cargo shipping costs." 
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The permanent increase in transportation costs mitigates against interpreting the permanent 
shock as the demand shock described by Kilian (2009). Consistent with arguments made by 
Kilian (2009), the positive relation between SHIP and PRICE could represent a demand shock 
that raises oil prices. But a significant increase in oil prices should (eventually) slow economic 
activity, as represented by SHIP. But the negative effect of a permanent increase in oil prices is 
not represented in Figure 2.3. That is, SHIP continues to rise after the initial increase in oil price. 
Eventually, SHIP does decline, but only slightly, from a peak of 0.159 five months after the shock 
to 0.139 twelve years after the shock. If one interprets the permanent shock as an unanticipated 
increase in oil demand due an unanticipated increase in economic activity, one would then have 
to argue that the resultant large increase in oil prices has little if any effect on economic activity. 
The statistical results of the CV AR model and impulse response functions are inconsistent 
with the results described in Kilian (2009) in two important ways: 
• Reductions in OPEC production ratse oil pnces, which ts consistent with a large 
literature on the effects of supply shocks. 
• Demand shocks, as represented by an increase in the transportation costs, reduce the 
FOB price of oil , which is inconsistent with the positive effect of demand shocks (as 
proxied by an increase in SHIP that is described by Kilian (2009). 
• Increases in oil prices increase the shipping index compiled by Kilian (2009), which is 
only consistent with interpreting the positive relation between SHIP and PRICE as the 
effect of higher oil prices on the cost of moving goods. 
These results beg the question, why do the results of the CV AR differ from those generated by 
the V AR? In these following sections, I attempt to identifY the causes for the differences by 
comparing results of CV AR's that retain individual aspects of the specification used by Kilian 
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(2009). 
2.4.2 The Measure of Oil Price 
Kilian (2009) uses the refiner' s acquisition cost of imported oil to measure oil prices. This 
measure creates two difficulties; ( 1) transportation costs are on both sides of the equations, 
individually as SHIP or as a part of refiner's acquisition cost, (2) it blurs the connection between 
supply and price because price includes transportation costs, tariffs, wharfage and demurrage, 
none of which accrue to producers. To investigate these possible effects, I re-estimate the CV AR 
with the inflation corrected refiner' s acquisition cost of imported oil instead of the FOB price. 
Repeating the procedure described in section 2, I find that the optimal lag length is two, there 
are two cointegrating relations and one exogenous stochastic trend and OPEC oil production is 
(weakly and strongly) exogenous. Changes in a, [J, rl, Aa, and AI matrices alter the long- and 
short-run relations in a way that highlights the confusion introduced by including transportation 
costs, wharfage, and demurrage, in the measure of oil prices. In the first cointegrating relation, 
the element associated with oil prices no longer is statistically different from zero (t = 1.37, p > 
0.17). This implies that the relatively straightforward relation between non-OPEC oil production 
and oil prices is disrupted by including transportation costs, wharfage, and demurrage in the 
measure of oil prices. In other words, the costs transportation, wharfage, and demurrage obfuscate 
the stochastic trend in FOB oil prices that cointegrates with non-OPEC oil supply. For the second 
cointegrating relation, a 22 is still significant, but a 32 no longer is statistically different from zero. 
Furthermore, r32 is not statistically different from zero (r32= -0.035, t = 1.12, p > 0.18), which 
indicates that real oil prices do not respond to short-run changes in SHIP. Together, these 
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results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that dry bulk maritime freight costs can be used to 
represent oil demand and/macroeconomic activity or that changes in SHIP can directly generate 
changes in PRICE. 
2.4.3 Disaggregating Oil Supply 
Kilian (2009) aggregates OPEC and non-OPEC oil production into a single variable and 
specifies the first difference of this aggregate6. The CV AR estimated in the base case suggests 
that OPEC and non-OPEC production behave differently. OPEC production is weakly exogenous 
(i .e. OPEC does not respond to changes in SHIP, PRICE, or NOPEC), whereas non-OPEC 
production is endogenous and is positively related to price. 
Consistent with the different behaviors, aggregating oil production undermines one of the 
most basic results of the base-case-that the system contains two cointegrating relations. The 
rank test statistics reject the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating relations 
( A11.ace = 48.15, p < 0.002) but fails to reject the null hypothesis of only one cointegrating 
relation ( Atrace = 1 0.2, p > 0.62 ). The one cointegrating relation that remains corresponds to the 
second cointegrating relation in the base model- the supply relation associated with the first 
cointegrating relation disappears. This disappearance is consistent with the notion that non-
OPEC producers are price takers that set production based on price, OPEC producers use some 
other criteria not included in the model, and that aggregating supply decisions, which use 
different criteria, obfuscates the relation between non-OPEC supply and price that is captured by 
6 I do not evaluate the effects of taking the first difference of aggregate supply. By definition, an 
1(0) time series (the percent change in total oil supply) can not have a long-run relation with I( 1) 
variables (SHIP, PRICE). 
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the first cointegrating relation in the base model. 
2. 4. 4 Lag Length 
In contrast to the two lags specified in the CV AR model described above, Kilian (2009) 
estimates a V AR with twenty-four lags, which seems to correspond to a two-year period7. To 
assess this difference, I relax the "rule of thumb" and use to the SBC and Han nan-Quinn criteria 
to consider up to twenty-five lags (twenty-four lagged first differences). The values of both 
criteria grow monotonically with lag length longer than two (one lagged first difference). Thus, 
using twenty-four lags in the CV AR is not consistent with the statistical criteria I use to choose 
the lag length. 
To examine the effect of choosing Kilian's lag length, I estimate the CVAR with twenty-four 
lagged first differences. This longer lag length changes one of the most basic results-that the 
system contains two cointegrating relations. The rank test statistics barely reject the null 
hypothesis of zero co integrating relations ( A trace = 43.3, p < 0.05) but fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of only one cointegrating relation ( Arrace = 20.8, p > 0.17). This change is consistent 
with a reduction in model efficiency at long lag lengths (Juselius, 2006). 
2.5 Conclusion 
Taken together, the results of this analysis suggest that the importance of demand shocks and 
the unimportance of supply shocks described by Kilian (2009) are not robust to alternative 
7 Kilian (2009) does not offer any objective basis for the choice of twenty-four lags. 
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specifications that are consistent with some widely held assumptions about the working of the 
world oil market. Although clever, the index for dry cargo bulk freight costs does not seem to 
proxy monthly macroeconomic activity and/or non-precautionary oil demand-the index for dry 
cargo bulk freight costs simply measures transportation costs. As such the positive relation with 
oil prices simply represents the effect of higher oil prices on transportation costs. It needs to be 
noted that this finding in and of itself does not diminish the importance of demand shocks- my 
results suggest that Kilian ' s finding does not support the demand shock hypothesis, because 
Kilian's shipping index is not a measure of aggregate demand. Therefore, more research is 
needed to determine the relative importance of aggregate demand shocks on the price of oil, 
provided that better proxies for aggregate demand become available at the global level. 
Furthermore, the results described here beg the interpretation of an oil demand shock. 
While exogenous political or weather events can generate significant reductions in oil demand 
(e.g. the earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan in March 2011 ), it is more difficult to tell a 
compelling a story for a positive oil demand shock. Oil is not consumed in isolation, it is 
consumed by capital equipment. Given that total capital stock changes little from one year to the 
next, it is difficult to describe a scenario in which a growing economy generates an oil shock-
rarely does oil consumption exceed expectations by a large percentage. Indeed, despite claims 
that a demand shock played a significant role in the 2007-2008 spike in oil prices, global 
consumption for oil grew less rapidly than forecast by the US Energy Information Administration 
in 2006. 
Of course, oil consumption, which is directly observable, is not equivalent to oil demand, 
which is not directly observable. So, it is possible that oil demand grew sharply during the 2007-
2008 oil price spike, but oil consumption grew only at trend. This mismatch is only possible if 
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the own price elasticity for oil demand is greater than the income elasticity. That is, oil demand 
grew sharply, but consumption was held back by the price effect. Such an effect is inconsistent 
with a large body of empirical results which indicate that the absolute value of the income 
elasticity for oil is much greater than the own price elasticity for oil. 
Instead, the results of this analysis are roughly consistent with the importance of oil supply 
shocks. As described by existing literature, price-taking non-OPEC nations use criteria different 
from those used by OPEC nations. And those criteria are not included in the CV AR estimated 
here, as indicated by the finding that OPEC production is exogenous. Furthermore, OPEC 
decisions have a long-run relation with oil prices, which is consistent with previous efforts to 
identify the effect of OPEC production on price (e.g. Gately et al., 1977; Kaufmann et al., 2004; 
Kaufmann et al., 2008; Chevillon and Rifflart, 2009). Together, these effects are consistent with 
the importance of both the positive price effects of OPEC supply shocks in the 1970' s and early 
1980's and negative price effects of the OPEC supply shocks in the mid 1980's. 
Lastly, I emphasize that the results presented here are simply meant to evaluate the evidence 
for the role of demand shocks as presented by Kilian (2009). Because the results suggest that dry 
cargo bulk freight cargo rates do not proxy economic activity or oil demand, the CV AR estimated 
here is missing important aspects of the demand side of the oil market. Furthermore, the CV AR 
fails to represent the depletion of non-OPEC production and so cannot simulate the lack of 
increased production since 2004, despite significant price increases. As such, the model results 
should not be interpreted as well-behaved model of the relation among oil supply, oil demand, 
and oil prices.8 
8 These shmt-comings are one reason I do not run further experiments with the CV AR, such as 
impulse response functions. 
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Table 2.1- Long-run relations as given by the elements of the a and fJ matrices 
Cointegrating Relation #1 Cointe2rating Relation #2 
Cointegrating Vector ( fJ) 
NOPEC 1.000 --
SHIP -- 1.000 
Price -0.395+ -0.844** 
OPEC -- -0.422 
Constant -0 .887 -0.394* 
Loadings (a) 
NOPEC equation -0 .010** -0.008 
SHIP equation 0.032** -0.062 
Price equation -0.008 0.024 
Table 2.2- Short-run (Gamma) matrix of endogenous variables 
11NOPECt-1 11SHIPt .. , 11PRICEt·-l 
NOPEC equation -0.287 ( -6.163) 0.053 (3.441) -0.026 (-1.201) 
SHIP equation -0.201 (-1.444) 0.273 (5.917) 0.151 (2.352) 
PRICE equation -0.076 (-0.805) 0.013 (0.431) 0.459 (10.602) 
Table 2.3 - Short-run effects of exogenous variable (OPEC) 
110PECt 110PECt··l 
NOPEC equation 0.045 (2.691) 0.020 (1.184) 
SHIP equation 0.006 (0.119) 0.106 (2 .143) 
PRICE equation -0.032 (-0.942) 0.024 (0.706) 
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3. THE RELATION AMONG TRADER POSITIONS AND OIL PRICES: BEYOND 
CAUSAL ORDER AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
3.1 Introduction 
Beginning in 2004, the price of crude oil fluctuates rapidly over a wide range. From $60 per 
barrel in 2004, the price for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) peaks at $148 in July 2008. Only six 
months later, the price drops under $40. In January 2012, the price moves beyond $100. And in 
July 2012, the price drops below $80. 
These large price swings probably are not caused solely by volatility--Dil prices are not 
especially volatile relative to other commodities (Regnier, 2007). Instead, these large price 
swings are attributed to two general causes; speculative expectations and market forces . 
Kaufmann (20 11) argues that speculation plays a significant role in the 2008/2009 price spike and 
collapse based on three changes; ( 1) a significant increase in private crude oil inventories that 
reverses more than twenty years of steady decline, (2) a break-down in the cointegrating 
relationship between spot and far month future prices that is inconsistent with arbitrage 
opportunities, and (3) statistical and predictive failures by an econometric model of oil prices that 
is based on market fundamentals . 
But such changes are only suggestive. More direct analyses of speculation's role examine the 
relation between trading behaviors and oil price. Masters (2008) argues that noncommercial 
traders now buy and sell oil as a financial asset. And the importance of these traders is 
increasing. Medlock and Jaffe (2009) note that about 50 percent of the outstanding positions in 
US futures markets is held by noncommercial traders. Much of this increase may be due to 
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institutional investors (e.g. sovereign wealth funds), who use commodity markets to diversify 
their portfolios. Commodities in general , and crude oil in particular, are a good hedge against 
inflation because commodity returns are positively correlated with inflation and a negative 
correlation with returns on stocks and long-term bonds make commodities a good hedge against 
investments in equity markets (G01ton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). 
If crude oil now is an option for wealth allocation, the effect of trader activity on oil prices 
depends on the information that is used to buy and sell oil (Weiner, 2002). If traders make 
decisions independently, their role is benign (Weiner, 2002). Conversely, if traders act as poorly 
informed participants, either by extrapolating past price changes (i.e. technical analysis) or by 
following the actions of other traders (i.e. herding or stampeding behavior), traders can amplify 
market volatility. Consistent with the latter, Medlock and Jaffe (2009) note that the run-up in oil 
prices is highly correlated with the increasing importance of noncommercial traders. 
Efforts to quantify a possible relation between trading behavior and oil prices follow two 
general approaches. One approach analyzes how traders make decisions. For example, Kraepels 
( 1999) argues that "of the hundreds of fund managers and commodity traders, the vast majority 
are "systems traders," relying upon the analysis of price trends for their trading decision and 
paying little if any attention to the fundamentals of the markets in which they are trading." This 
characterization is supported by econometric results that provide "convincing evidence of 
positive feedback trading in the oil market" (Cifarelli and Paladino, 20 I 0). Both of these results 
are consistent with the hypothesis that speculative expectations play a significant role in the large 
pnce swmgs. 
But this conclusion is inconsistent with results that are generated by another approach, which 
examines the causal relation between crude oil prices and trader positions. To date, most of this 
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literature seeks to answer the question, do trader positions 'Granger cause' oil prices and/or do oil 
prices 'Granger cause' trader positions? If trader positions 'Granger cause' oil prices, trader 
positions could generate speculative movements that drive oil prices far from the level suggested 
by market fundamentals. Conversely, the role of traders is seemingly diminished by findings that 
oil prices 'Granger cause' trader positions. 
To date, econometric analyses generally indicate that oil pnces 'Granger cause' trader 
positions while there is little evidence that trader positions 'Granger cause' oil prices. This 
statistical ordering is first reported by Sanders et al. (2004), who use a vector autoregression 
(VAR) to analyze the relation between commitments of traders (as compiled by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission) and market returns. They find that the net long position held by 
commercial hedgers declines following price increases. However, traders' net positions do not 
lead market returns. These general results are replicated by several studies, including the ITF 
(2008) and Biiyiik~ahin and Harris (2011). 
Econometric results that indicate a causal relation from oil prices to trader positions do not 
invalidate the hypothesis that trader positions have an important effect on oil prices. First, the 
technique used to analyze causal order, a vector autoregression (V AR), may not be ideal for time 
series of oil prices and trader positions that contain a stochastic trend (see below). When non-
stationary time series are present, V AR modeling techniques cannot represent cointegration and 
error correction (Engle and Granger, 1987; Stock and Watson, 1988; Sims, Stock and Watson, 
1990). 
Furthermore, statistical results regarding causal order depend in large part on the information 
set of conditioning variables. The results described above are generated from VARs that include 
oil prices and trader positions only. Even those who argue for the importance of speculation 
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3.2.4 Ten Models 
Equation 3.4 is used to generate ten CVAR models, each of which includes the five measures 
of trader positions, inventories in PADD 2, and the spot price, but differ according to the the 
maturity of the futures contract and the interest rate. For all models, one of the two prices is the 
WTI spot price. The other is the price for a futures contract, with either a one-, two-, three-, six-
or twelve-month maturity. Each of these five combinations of a spot and futures pries is 
estimated twice, once with the interest rate on the three-month Treasury Bill and once with the 
interest on the six-month Treasury Bill. Both interest rates are tested because there is no a priori 
reason to prefer one. Thus, the two possibilities for Treasury bill interest rates, combined with 
five possibilities for futures contract maturities, generate ten CVAR models. Each of these ten 
models is ' named' based on the maturity date of the futures contract the Treasury Bill. 
3.3 Results 
For all models, the smallest values of both the Hannan-Quinn and Schwarz Bayesian criteria 
indicate a lag length of two. A value of two lags implies that there is one lagged first difference 
per variable per equation crl (L1x:t-l ,8wt-1) in addition to the error correction mechanism 
because the CV AR model is based on first differences. 
For all models, the Atrace statistic strongly (p < .001) rejects the null hypothesis that there 
are zero cointegrating relations. This implies that there is one or more long-run relations among 
oil prices, trader positions, oil inventories, and interest rates. For all ten CV ARs, the Atrace 
statistic indicates that there are four cointegrating relations. In all cases, the variables that make 
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up the four cointegrating relations are identified by imposing a set of restrictions on elements of 
the co integrating vectors that is far from the p = 0.05 critical value (Table 3.1 ). 
For each CV AR model, one or more of the time series are weakly exogenous (Table 3.1). The 
variable(s) that is weakly exogenous varies among models, and includes spot oil prices (five 
models), futures prices (five models), and crude oil inventories (two models). 
Finally, differences in the interest rate on the three- and six-month Treasury bill generally 
have little effect on the results. The most notable difference concerns the exogenous price 
variable in the models for the three-month futures contract. Specifically, the futures prices is 
weakly exogenous in the model that uses the interest rate from the three month Treasury bill 
whereas the spot price is exogenous in the model that uses the interest rate from the six month 
Treasury bill. This difference should not be over-emphasized. As indicated in Table 3.1 , tests of 
weak exogeneity are far from the critical value in all cases-the exogenous price variable is 
decided by a secondary criterion that the price with the smallest value for the test of weak 
exogeneity is made weakly exogenous. 
3.4 Discussion 
All ten CV AR models contain at least one cointegrating relation that can be interpreted as a 
cointegrating relation for the endogenous oil price (Tables 3.2-3 .3). These cointegrating relations 
include the spot price, a futures price, oil inventories, and a measure of trader positions, and load 
into the equation for the endogenous oil price such that the endogenous oil price error corrects 
towards the equilibrium value that is implied by this cointegrating relation. In the model for the 
near-month contract (and three-month Treasury Bill) the first cointegrating relation includes both 
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the spot and futures pnce, oil inventories, and the short position by non-commercial traders 
(Table 3 .2), and disequilibrium in this co integrating relation loads (a= -1.06) into the equation 
for the first difference of the spot price in a way that moves the spot price towards the long-run 
value implied by the first cointegrating relation (Table 3.2). As such, this cointegrating relation 
can be interpreted as a co integrating relation for the spot price for WTI. 
All of the cointegrating relations for price contain one measure of trader positions. In 
addition to rejecting (p < .05) the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated with the trader 
position is zero, the inclusion of trader positions is evaluated by testing a restriction that 
eliminates the measure of trader position from the cointegrating relation for price in the over-
identified model. In all cases, the test statistic rejects the null hypothesis that eliminating trader 
positions does not change the likelihood function given the rank condition (Table 3.1). This 
rejection suggests that spot price, future prices, and oil inventories do not cointegrate. As such, 
the traditional cash and carry model does not describe completely, the relation between spot and 
futures prices for WTI. Specifically, trader positions have information about the long-run 
difference between spot and futures prices that is not contained in inventories and/or interest 
rates. This result clearly suggests that trader positions play a role in price discovery. 
The effect of trader positions on price is as expected. The sign on the coefficient associated 
with a long position indicates a positive relation with the endogenous oil price whereas the 
coefficient associated with short position indicates a negative relation with the endogenous oil 
price. For example, solving the first cointegrating relation in the model of the near-month future 
price (three-month Treasury Bill) for the spot price as follows: 
S, =- 0.002 *I,+ 1.004 * F;
1
,- 0.004 *Non- Commercial_ Short, 
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indicates that short positions by noncommercial traders (along with oil inventories I) have a 
negative long-run relation with spot prices. And because this cointegrating relation loads into the 
equation for the first difference of spot prices, an increase in short positions by noncommercial 
traders will reduce spot prices. 
Positions by commercial traders (as opposed to noncommercial traders) are present in eight of 
the ten models. At first glance, the importance of commercial positions seems to contradict the 
importance of speculation by non-commercial traders. Nonetheless, activity by commercial 
traders may create a bubble in the oil market (Tokic, 2011). According to this hypothesis, the 
advantages of portfolio-diversifying investments in commodities (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 
2006) push institutional investors to invest in crude oil even after prices move beyond the upper 
value of a price range that is consistent with market fundamentals. As this happens, commercial 
hedgers lose their informational advantage, which pushes them to remove their short hedges. 
This reduces their ability to arbitrage inefficiencies in the traditional cash and carry model. And 
by doing so, oil producers become positive feedback traders, buying the crude oil futures as the 
price of crude oil rises. This explanation is consistent with the importance of commercial long 
positions in six of the ten models. 
The loadings of the cointegrating relation for price have information about the causal order 
among oil prices, trader positions, and oil inventories. In all cases (other than the models for the 
two-month futures contract), the cointegrating relation for price loads into the equation for the 
first difference of the trader position in a way that moves the trader position towards the long-run 
value that is implied by the cointegrating relation for price. This result, coupled with results that 
the cointergation relation for price loads in the equation for the endogenous oil price, indicate that 
adjustments between trader positions and oil prices run in both directions, as opposed the 
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unidirectional causal relation from oil prices to trader positions that is suggested by previous 
analyses (Sanders eta/. , 2004; ITF, 2008; Btiytik~ahin and Harris, 20 II). This difference may be 
generated by the inclusion of variables other than prices and the use of a CV AR rather than a 
VAR. 
The cointegrating relations for pnce also illustrate the relation between pnces and oil 
inventories. The cointegrating relations for price show a negative long-run relation between 
inventories and the spot price when the spot price is endogenous. Consistent with market 
fundamentals, an exogenous increase in oil inventories depresses spot prices. This relation often 
is the basis of media reports that relate movements in spot or future prices to government 
announcement regarding inventories (e.g. New York Times, 1993). 
Conversely, the cointegrating relations for price in the models for futures contracts with 
maturity dates of three, six, or twelve months load into the equations for both the endogenous 
futures price and oil inventories in a way that moves both variables toward the equilibrium value 
that is implied by the cointegrating relation. In these cointegrating relations, there is a negative 
relation between oil inventories and the exogenous spot price. This relation is consistent with the 
notion that an unexpected short-run increase in demand (e.g. an unusual period of cold weather) 
will reduce oil inventories (i.e. a draw on stocks) and cause spot prices to rise (Pindyck, 200 I). 
The result that adding a trader positions (and oil inventories) to the traditional cash and carry 
model generates cointegration between the spot and future price may explain previous results, 
which suggest that spot and futures prices do not cointegrate. For example, Moos and AI-
Loughani (1994) find that spot and futures prices for WTI do not cointegrate and they argue that 
this lack of cointegration is due to a time varying risk premium. Gulen (1998) and Maslyuk and 
' 
Smyth (2009) try to fix this omission by allowing for a structural break in the relation between 
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spot and futures prices. This approach generates results that indicate cointegration, but allowing 
for a structural break may simply be a statistical ' fix ' for problem that is caused by omitted 
variables. Our results clearly indicate that spot and futures prices cointegrate when their long 
(and short) run relations are estimated as part of a system that includes trader positions, oil 
inventories, and interest rates. 
The inclusion of variables other than spot and futures prices and the use of a CV AR rather 
than a V AR allow us to revisit an important aspect of the efficient market hypothesis, the 
prediction hypothesis. The prediction hypothesis, which postulates that price discovery occurs 
largely in the futures markets, can be evaluated based on the classification of spot and futures 
prices as exogenous/endogenous and the loadings of the cointegrating relation for price. For 
models of the near- and two-month futures contract, the futures price is weakly exogenous and 
the cointegrating relation for price loads into the equation for the first difference of the spot 
prices. These results suggest that price discovery occurs in the futures market and that spot prices 
'error correct' to changes in futures prices. As such, these results are consistent with the 
prediction hypothesis. In addition to the standard arguments made by the prediction hypothesis, 
the near month and two month futures contracts are traded heavily and so may have information 
about supply and demand in world oil markets that goes beyond the physical supply and demand 
for a single crude that may be losing its ability to serve as a benchmark (Fattouh, 2007). 
Furthermore, the futures price is more transparent than the spot price because there is no 
requirement for public disclosure of spot contracts. Instead, spot prices are generated by price 
reporting agencies that use different methodologies (Fattouh, 2011 ). This result is consistent with 
those generated by Schwarz and Szakmary (1994) who find that futures prices dominate price 
discovery for light sweet crude oils. But a leading role for futures prices contradicts results that 
spot prices lead the near month and three month futures prices with no relation with six and nine 
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month futures prices (Quan, 1992). 
Conversely, the prediction hypothesis is inconsistent with results generated by models of 
futures contracts with six or twelve-month maturities. In these models, the spot price is weakly 
exogenous and the cointegrating relation for price loads into the equation for the first difference 
of futures prices. These results suggest that price discovery occurs in the spot market and that 
far-month futures prices 'error correct' to changes in spot prices. This reversal may be explained 
by the expiration dates on the futures contracts. Trading in these far month markets is thin and 
therefore their price evolution may follow prices on more heavily traded spot markets (either 
directly, or as transmitted to spot prices via near- and two-month futures contracts). This result 
contracts those reported by Silvapulle and Moosa (1994) who find that futures prices (near 
month, three month, and six month maturities) lead spot prices, with some evidence or a smaller 
nonlinear causal relationship from spot prices to futures prices. 
Beyond the direction of causality, the rate at which the difference between spot and futures 
prices reaches the equilibrium varies systematically with the maturity of the futures contract 
(Table 3.4). Disequilibrium in the price difference between the spot and near-month contract is 
eliminated very quickly, as indicated by the -1.06 value for the alpha that loads the cointegrating 
relation for price into the equation for the first difference of spot prices. This is consistent with 
arbitrage opportunities between spot and near month contracts. The opportunity for arbitrage 
declines as the expiry date for the futures contract extends further into the future and this is 
reflected by a slowing in the rate of adjustment as the maturity of the future contract extends 
beyond two months (Table 3.4). 
An addition to adjustments via the cointegrating relation for price, futures prices adjust to 
spot prices via short-run effects that are quantified by the elements of r. The elements of r 
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that are associated with the first difference in spot prices are positive for the equation for the first 
difference of futures contracts with two, three, six, and twelve month maturities. The values 
imply that about 20-30 percent of a change in the spot prices appears the next period in the 
futures price. This effect is absent for the near month contract, in which the loading of the 
cointegrating relation ensures rapid adjustment. Spot prices do not have a statistically significant 
short-run effect on futures prices at any maturity. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The results generated by the ten CV AR models suggest that the long-run cointegrating 
relation between spot and futures prices for WTI is possible only if the models include oil 
inventories and trader positions. The inclusion of the latter implies that trader positions may play 
an important role in price discovery. This result provides additional evidence that speculation 
plays a role in price discovery. A role for speculation is re-inforced by results that suggest a bi-
directional adjustment between prices and trader positions, as opposed to the one way causal 
relation from oil prices to trader positions that is suggested by previous analyses. 
While these results are consistent with a role of speculation in the recent spike and collapse in 
oil prices, the results reported here do not answer several important questions, such as how 
important is the effect of trader position on spot or futures prices and do their effects change over 
time. To answer these effects, future research will use impulse response functions to quantify the 
effects of trader positions and recursive estimation techniques to examine the degree to which the 
price effects oftrader positions, oil inventories, and/or interest rates change over time. 
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Table 3.1 - Diagnostic statistics for the CV AR models 
WTI(I) WTI(2) WTI(3) WTI(6) WTI(I2) 
3-month T-bill 
rate models 
WTI (spot) 27.78 4.52 1.32 0.78 3.89 
Commercial long 11.17 17.05 19.96 21.54 21 .22 
Commercial short 10.63 11.93 13 .64 16.39 18.26 
Noncomm. Long 15.98 14.70 14.12 13 .26 13.10 
Noncomm. short 18.36 16.75 15 .26 13 .32 13.75 
Noncom. Spread 13.15 8.43+ 8.36+ 8.17+ 7.94+ 
3-month T-bill rate 11 .65 12.63 12.85 11 .56 10.32 
Inventori es 5.45 17.57 20.07 • 21.45 22.61 ' 
WTI (futures) 2.98 0.58 1.23 4.67 12.36 
Coint. relations 4 4 4 4 4 
Jdent. restrictions x2 (23) x2 (19) x2 (19) x2 (19) x2 (19) = 18.34 
= 25.90 = 17.71 = 18.63 = 16.69 
Excl ude trader x2 (1) = 4.11· x2 (1) = 6.4o' x2 (1) = 5.14' x2 (1) = x2 (1) = 7.10 .. 
position 6.86 .. 
Unbiasedness x2 (1) = 4.4o' xz(l) = x2 (1) = x2 (1) = x2 (1) = 9.78" 
7.25 .. 5.58 .. 8.53** 
6-month T-hill 
rate models 
WTI (spot) 27.97 4.52 1.45 1.16 4.50 
Commercial long 10.88 17.06 20.03 21 .87 21.77 
Commercial short 11.73 13 .16 14.96 17.76 18.98 
Noncomm. Long_ 14.73 13.36 12.80 12.25 12.41 
Noncomm. short 18.26 16.76 15.31 13.69 14.35 
Noncom. Spread 16.43 12.09 12.03 11 .82 11.55 
6-month T -bill rate 12.32 13 .36 13 .62 12.57 11.73 
Inventories 6.01 18.46 20.97 22.44 23 .39 
WTI (futures) 3.29 0.97 1.71 5.19 12.72' 
Coint. relations 4 4 4 4 4 
Jdent. restrictions x2 (23) x2 (19) x2 (19) x2 (19) x2 (19) = 20.08 
= 27.10 = 18.65 = 19.20 = 17.75 
Exclude trader x2 (1) = 4.04' x2 (1) = x2 (1) = xz(l) = x2 (1) = 7.50" 
position 6.98 .. 8.97 .. 7.42' 
Unbiasedness x2 (1) = 4.39' xz(l) = x2 (1) = x2 (1) = x2 (1) = 
8.01 .. 10.29 .. 9.40 .. 10.26 .. 
Test statistics are statistically significantly different from zero at the: ** 1%, *5%, +I 0% level. 
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Table 3.2- Results of CV ARs with 3-month Treasury bill rate 
WTI(O) C Long c Short N long N Short Spread TB3N Inventory WTI(#) 
WTI(J) 
CR# I 1.ooor -- -- -- 0.004 'T -- -- o.oo::( -1.004 ' 
CR#2 -- -- -- 1.ooor -0.997 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.102 -- -- -0.897' 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -- -- -0.119 -- -0.876 1.000 -- -- -0.005 
WTI(2) 
CR#1 ! 1.000 -- 0.017 -- -- -- -- 0.019 - !.0 16' 
CR#2 -- -- -- 1.ooor -0.993 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- 0.038 -- 1.000 -1.044 -- -- -- --
CR#4 -- -- 0.045 -- 1.000 -1.053 -- -- 0.002' 
WTI(3) 
CR#1' -0.97 1 't -0.029'T -- -- -- -- -- -0.034 't 1.000 
CR#2 -- -- -- 1.ooor -0.993 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.046 -- -- -0.948 !.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -- -- -0.054 -- -0.939 1.000 -- -- -0.003 
WTI(6) 
CR#1 -0.952 -0.045'T -- -- -- -- -- -0.067'T 1.000r 
CR#2 -- -- -- 1.ooor -0.993 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.053 -- -- -0.944 1.000 -- -- --





-0.110 1.000r -- -- -- -- --
CR#2 -- -- -- -0.991 1.00 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.062 • -- -- -0.945" 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 0.042' -- 1.000 -- 12.924 -13.863 -- -- --
Test statistics are statistically significantly different from zero at the: ** 1%, *5%, +10% leveL 
Variables in red are exogenous to the CVAR 
-- Variable excluded from the cointegrating relation based on overidentif)ting restrictions. 
t Co integrating relation loads into the equation for that variable in a way that moves the variables 
towards the equilibrium value implied by the cointegrating relation (p< 0.1 0). 
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Table 3.3 - Results of CV ARs with 6-month Treasury bi II rate 
WTI(O) c Long C Short N long N Short Spread TB6N Inventory WTI(#) 
WTI(l) 
CR# I 1.ooot -- -- -- 0.004 ·r -- -- 0.002' -1.004 •• 
CR#2 -- -- I.OOOT -0.998 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.114 -- -- -0.886 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -- -- -0.132 -- -0.863 1.000 -- -- -0 .006 
WTI(2) 
CR# I 1.000 -- 0.017" -- -- -- -- 0.019 'T -1.017 •• 
CR#2 -- -- -- 1.000r -0.996 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- 0.064 -- -- 1.000 -1.068 -- -- --




CR# J· -0.969 ' -o.03o ·r -- -- -- -- -- -0.033 't I .OOOT 
CR#2 -- -- -- l .ooor -0.998 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.072 -- -- -0.927 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -- -- -0.083 -- -0.912 1.000 -- -- -0.004 
WTI(6) 
CR# I· -0.950 -0.046 't -- -- -- -- -- -0.067 1.ooor 
CR#2 -- -- -- I.OOOT -0.997 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.074 -- -- -0.926 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -0.004' -- -0.086 -- -0.911 1.000 -- -- --
WTI(12) 
CR# I -0.920"' -0.068 "T -- -- -- -- -- -0.110 ·r l.ooor 
CR#2 -- -- -- -I.OOOT 1.00 -- -- -- --
CR#3 -- -0.078 -- -- -0.924 1.000 -- -- --
CR#4 -0.039. -- 1.000 -- 9.884 -10.887 -- -- --
Test statistics are statistically significantly different from zero at the: ** 1%, *5%, + 10% level. 
Variables in red are exogenous to the CVAR 
-- Variable excluded from the cointegrating relation based on overidentifying restrictions. 
t Cointegrating relation loads into the equation for that variable in a way that moves the variables 
towards the equilibrium value implied by the cointegrating relation (p< 0.10). 
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Table 3.4 - Error correction and short-run effects 
WTI(l) WTI(2) WTI(3) WTI(6) WTI(12) 
3-month 
Treasury bill 
a spol -1.06 -0.29* 0.17+ -- --
a Future -- -- -- -0.09+ -0.07* 
r spol -0.12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 
r Future 0.13 0.30* 0.30* 0.20* 0.16* 
6-month 
Treasury bill 
a spol -1.06 -0.29* -- -- --
a Fuwre -- -- -0.15+ -0.09+ -0.07* 
r .,pol -0.12 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
r Future 0.13 0.30* 0.22* 0.20* 0.16* 
Test statistics are statistically significantly different from zero at the: ** 1%, *5%, + 10% level. 
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4. Crude oil: Commodity and/or financial asset? 
4.1 Introduction 
Beginning in 2004, the price of crude oil fluctuates rapidly over a wide range. From $60 per 
barrel in 2004, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil peaks at $148 in July 2008, 
falls to $40 six month later, and rises to $107 in March 2012. In July, 2012, the price of oil drops 
below $80. 
This price volatility imposes costs on the macroeconomy. These costs are partly associated 
with an asymmetric macroeconomic response to oil price changes, whereby oil price increases 
slow economic growth or cause recessions, while oil price decreases do not increase the growth 
rate of real GOP (Mork, 1989). This phenomenon is observed both in the United States and other 
OECD countries (Mork et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1995). This asymmetric response is generated by 
a variety ofmechanisms (Darby, 1982; Hamilton, 1988; Bohi, 1991). 
Beyond this asymmetry, oil price volatility causes sectoral shocks that affect the 
macroeconomy via investment decisions that affect long-lasting infrastructure, the economy' s 
potential output, and the elasticity of demand and substitution for oil and other forms of energy. 
Bemanke ( 1983) shows that oil price volatility induces firms to postpone costly, irreversible 
investments. The causes for this delay are straight-forward-increasing uncertainty about oil 
prices makes it rational to postpone decisions because waiting increases the probability of 
obtaining additional information that would lead to better decisions. 
The potentially large macroeconomic impact of increased price volatility begs the question 
of its cause. The literature posits three possible causes: market fundamentals, speculative 
expectations, or correlations among markets due to capital flows (Kaufmann, 2011 ). If market 
fundamentals are responsible for large changes in prices (e.g. Kaufmann et al., 2008; Kilian, 
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2009), policy intervention is justified only if the macroeconomic benefits of reducing volatility 
exceed the costs of suppressing information about changes in market fundamentals. The 
threshold for intervention is considerably lower if price volatility reflects changes in speculative 
expectations of future prices or changes in capital flows. 
There is evidence that speculation is responsible for a portion of the volatility in oil prices. 
Masters (2008) finds that non-commercial traders buy and sell oil as a financial asset and that 
non-commercial traders hold about 50 percent of oil futures positions at the time of the study's 
publication, and that this percentage grows steadily over the past decade (Medlock and Jaffe, 
2009). The ratio of non-commercial to commercial traders in the futures market is important 
because the former do not hold oil for physical delivery, rather non-commercial traders buy and 
sell to profit from price movements - in other words, they hold these assets for speculative 
reasons. By contrast, commercial traders are involved in producing, processing, selling and 
buying oil , and so they reduce exposure to price changes via hedging. Given these different goals, 
the substantial increase in the ratio of non-commercial to commercial traders over the past decade 
indicates a greater presence of speculators in the oil market. 
But an increase in the presence of speculators does not automatically increase oil pnce 
volatility. If speculators act as predicted by the rational expectations and the efficient market 
hypotheses, their actions are benign (Weiner, 2002). Conversely, price volatility is enhanced if 
the behavior by non-commercial traders can be described by herding, technical analysis, 
contagion, and/or extrapolation. Consistent with these possible behaviors, Kraepels (1999) 
argues that "of the hundreds of fund managers and commodity traders, the vast majority are 
"systems traders," relying upon the analysis of price trends for their trading decision and paying 
little if any attention to the fundamentals of the markets in which they are trading." This 
characterization is supported by econometric results that provide "convincing evidence of 
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positive feedback trading in the oil market" (Cifarelli and Paladino, 2010). Similarly, Kolodziej 
and Kaufmann (in review) find that trader positions (and oil inventories) are needed to explain the 
cash-and-carry relationship between spot and futures prices. 
Alternatively, the volatility of oil price could be enhanced by capital flows among markets 
that are designed to diversity portfolios (e.g. between stock and commodity markets) if non-
commodity markets are inefficient compared to predictions made by the rational 
expectations/efficient market hypotheses. Specifically, large capital flows between equity and 
commodity markets could alter commodity prices beyond levels indicated by market 
fundamentals. These flows could be motivated by empirical observations that commodities are a 
good hedge against investments in equity markets because commodity prices in general, and 
crude oil prices in patticular, are positively correlated with inflation and negatively correlated 
with returns on stocks and long-term bonds (Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). 
Several studies present evidence for correlations between prices in equity and commodity 
markets. UNCTAD (2011) shows that starting in 2004, correlations between oil prices and 
financial assets increase, as measured by correlations between daily data in 30-day rolling-
windows. Analyzing correlations estimated from one-year rolling windows for daily data, Tang 
and Xiong (2011) find that correlations between the prices for crude oil and various commodities 
strengthen over time. Btiyiik~ahin and Robe (2011) also identifY a sharp increase in equity-
commodity market cross-correlations that start in the fall of 2008, but find no evidence for a 
longer-term secular trend . Analyzing daily data, Bicchetti and Maystre (20 12) find that although 
daily data suggest a positive correlation between S&P500 and WTI that starts in 2005, these 
correlations do not appear in high-frequency data before 2008. In that year, a structural break 
occurs and correlations rise from below 0.1 to 0.5 and remain at approximately that level 
thereafter. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reaches similar conclusions using lower-
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frequency data (EIA, 20 12). Bicchetti and Maystre (20 12) find correlations using high-frequency 
data (l-hour, 5-minute, I 0-second and !-second frequencies) for WTI crude oil and several other 
commodities (corn, soybeans, wheat, sugar, live cattle) and the E-mini S&P500 stock market 
index. Furthermore, their results suggest a structural break in 2008 that marks a substantial 
increase in commodity and equity market cross-correlations. These studies suggest either on-
going changes or structural breaks in the cross-market linkages and/or speculative influences, 
regardless of whether the correlations are caused by a general financialization of the oil market 
(Tang and Xiong, 20 11) or due to increasing participation by specific types of traders, such as 
hedge funds (Btiytik~ahin and Robe, 2011). 
Here I examine the relation among daily returns to oil prices, equity prices, and commodity 
markets by modifying previous efforts in two important ways; expanding the number of variables, 
which ameliorates omitted variable bias, and estimating the expanded model using the Kalman 
Filter, which reduces uncertainty associated with using OLS to estimate equations from rolling 
windows. Specifically, the model is expanded to include equity prices for an oil-producing 
company, ConocoPhillips. This expansion allows the model to separate changes in oil prices due 
to market fundamentals from other sources of change. In theory, the equity price for oil 
producing firms represents the present value of rents due to the extraction of crude oil from 
proved reserves. As such, a correlation between returns to direct investments in crude oil and oil-
producing firms should represent long-run changes in prices due to market fundamentals . 
Furthermore, the residual of this correlation should be 'white noise.' But if cross market capital 
flows (or speculation) play a significant role in oil price discovery, these oil price movements will 
not be included fully in equity prices of oil producing firms. Price movements not included in the 
equity prices of oil producing firms will impmt a pattern to the regression error from the 
correlation between returns to direct investments in crude oil and indirect investments in oil-
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producing firms. And this pattern may be related to equity indices if cross-market capital flows 
and/or speculative expectations affect oil prices. 
Second, I estimate this expanded model using the Kalman filter . Previous studies estimate 
the relation between equity and oil prices from rolling windows, but the optimal width of the 
rolling window is unknown, may be time-varying, and therefore, may influence the results 
generated by these estimates. Sensitivity analysis can be used to assess the effect of window 
widths on the point estimates, however there are no objective criteria to choose the results 
generated by one set of rolling windows. To reduce this source of uncertainty, I estimate models 
using both rolling windows and a Kalman filter model that estimates the optimal state variable 
(regression coefficient) variances as well as the overall equation (measurement) variance. 
Results indicate that there is a positive correlation between returns to the spot price of WTI 
and ConocoPhillips throughout the sample period and this correlation allows us to quantify a 
change in the correlation between returns to WTI and the S&P 500, which is negative between 
2003 and 2008 and positive from 2009 forward . This change is explained by a large reduction in 
interest rates in the fourth quarter of 2008, which reduces the convenience yield earned on 
physical holdings of crude oil. This reduction in convenience yields is associated with a change 
from backwardation to contango in crude oil markets. These two changes alter the source of 
returns such that crude oil is converted from a commodity to a financial asset, which is termed the 
financialization of oil. 
These results, and the methods used to obtain them, are described in four sections. The 
second section describes the data sources, as well as the statistical models used to perform the 




Observations for the price ofWTI on the New York Mercantile Exchange (WTI) , the price of 
ConocoPhillips stock on the New York Stock Exchange (COP), and the Standard and Poor' s 500 
index (SP500) are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database. TRTH 
provides data for 45 million different financial instruments across over 400 exchanges, for both 
quotes and trades at the millisecond and microsecond frequencies. Because the number of trades 
at these high frequencies is extremely small (in fact, trades do not occur every millisecond but 
only once in a while), these data are down-sampled (using sample means) to daily frequencies. 
Daily data for the spot price of gold are obtained from Globex. 
Data are available for October 7, 1996 through August 21 , 2011. The sample period is 
defined by the longest period for which observations are available for all time series. All time 
series are transformed from levels into log-differences. This transformation is used because 
correlations among market returns are more relevant than correlations among levels. 
Furthermore, the logarithmic transformation of the variables compresses the variable ranges, 
which improves convergence of the Kalman filter maximum likelihood algorithm. 
The daily frequency is chosen to avoid the effects of structural changes that are associated 
with the implementation of around-the-clock electronic trading. As described by Bicchetti and 
Maystre (2012), round-the-clock electronic trading starts in September 2007. Before then, 
transaction volumes are very low. Therefore, performing a very high-frequency analysis could 
potentially involve estimating pre- and post-fully-electronic regimes, in which case one might 
have in-sample data availability and regime change issues. 
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4.2.2 Models 
To analyze the relation among oil and equity prices, I estimate models using OLS applied to 
rolling windows and using the Kalman filter. The latter is chosen because it allows me to 
determine the optimal degree of coefficient persistence and smoothing (as in separating the noise 
from the signal). The Kalman filter model also allows us to measure both partial correlations 
(regression coefficients) and the standard errors, which are used to determine the statistical 
significance of the partial correlations. Quantifying confidence intervals for these time-varying 
estimates is imperative. Confidence intervals are estimated from rolling-window regressions as 
well, but the standard errors could be affected by the window size. Specifically, if the window is 
too wide, too much persistence will be included. To assess these potential effects, I compare 
results generated by the Kalman filter model to regressions estimated from one-year rolling 
windows. 
The rolling-window regression model can be written as 
Yt = Xtf3t + Et estimated for tE[t0 , t0 + w], t 0 E[1, T- w] (4.1) 
in which T represents the number of observations and w is the width of the rolling window. That 
is, I take a subsample of w observations, and estimate the model with a subset that starts at 
[1, w + 1] and ends at [T- w, T] . 
The Kalman filter with time-varying coefficients is specified as: 
St+l = dt + TtSt + RtYJt 
Yt = Ct + Ztst + et 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
in which St E Rm, Yt E Rk (with k being 1 in this case), Ct E Rk, Tt E Rmxm, Zt E Rkxm, 
Rt E Rmxn, YJt ERn, et E Rk, YJt-N(O, Qt), et-N(O, Ht), i and Qt and Ht are positive-definite. 
In the analysis below, it is assumed that et and YJt are independent. 
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Equation 4.2 is called the state or transition equation and equation 4.3 is called the 
measurement equation. The meaning of the state vector St depends on the application (e.g. a 
noisy signal to be filtered in an electrical engineering application). In the statistical application of 
linear regression, the state vector represents the regression coefficients. For my model: 
(4.4) 
the state vector wi II be 
r
f3o,t1 f3u 
St = fht 
f33 ,t 
(4.5) 
and the states (regression coefficients) evolve according to a random walk 
rJi,t-N(O, O"JJ, i E [0,3] (4.6) 
I can rewrite the model as follows: 
rf3o,t1 
llln(WTI,) ~ [1 "llln(GOLD,) llln(SPSOO,) llln(COP,)] ~::: + e, ( 4.7) 
f33 ,t 
f3o,t+l ~ r~ 0 0 0 ol Po.< /3l,t+l 1 0 0 0 f3l,t f3z,t+l 0 1 0 0 f3z,t f33 ,t+l 0 0 1 0 f33t 







This means that Tt = Rt = /4 , Ct = 0, dt = 0, 
Zt = [1 !lln(GOLDt) !lln(SPSOOt) !lln(COPt)] , 
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Allowing for diffuse initialization (Tsay 2005, p. 503), I still need to determine CJJi' the 
state variances for the time-varying coefficients and CJ;, the measurement equation variance. 
These are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function 
T 
p(yl, ····YTICJe,CJ7J) = P(Y11CJe,CJ7J) n(Yt1Ft-1,CJe,CJ7J) 
t=2 
T 
= P(Y1ICJe,CJ77 ) n(vt1Ft-1,CJe,CJ77 ) (4.9) 
t=2 
Diffuse initialization implies 2: 110 = oo, which implies s1 ~N(Yv CJ;) . I can then 
estimate the vector CJJ and the scalar CJ; using maximum likelihood procedures. One approach is 
to set CJ; = 1 and have the CJJ vector adjust to maximize the likelihood function - that will 
concentrate the measurement error variance. Another option is to let both CJ; and CJJ vary. I use 
the latter to estimate the variances. To prevent convergence to a local optimum, I use the 
gradient-free simplex solver. To make sure that the simplex solver identifies a global maximum, I 
also use a genetic algorithm to maximize the likelihood function . The results indicate that they 
are the same to within the specified tolerance limit. This suggests that the two methods find the 
same (global) maximum and that the results reported in the next section are not sensitive to the 
method used to maximize the likelihood function . 
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4.3. Results 
The maximum likelihood-based variance estimates are as follows: 
(JJgold = 2.2890£ - 5 
(JJS&PSOO = 7.2156£- 4 
CJJcoP = 1.7304£- 4 
(Ji = 5.4109£-4 
Because CJi * 1, these are unconcentrated measurement equation variance estimates. These 
variance estimates are hard to interpret on their own without visualizing their impact on both the 
degree of filtering of the stochastically evolving model coefficients, as well as on their standard 
errors. 
As indicated in Figure 4.1 , the dependent variable (WTI) is positively correlated with the 
price of the ConocoPhillips stock (COP) over the sample period. Furthermore, this positive 
relation is statistically different from zero for the entire sample period. Conversely, the 
significance and sign of the relation between WTI and SP500 changes over the sample period. 
Early in the sample period, 1997- 2002, there is no relation between WTI and SP500. Between 
2003 and late 2008, the relation generally is negative. From 2009 through the end ofthe sample 
period in early 2012, the relation between WTI and SP500 is positive. Lastly, the relation 
between WTI and gold goes from slightly negative to slightly positive during the sample period, 
although it is not statistically different from zero for much of the mid-sample period. These 
results are similar to those generated by estimating equation 4.3 from samples of one year rolling 
windows (Figure 4.2). 
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4.4. Discussion 
Results generated by both the Kalman Filter and the regression model estimated from rolling 
windows indicate that there is a positive relation between returns to direct investments in crude 
oil (WTI) and indirect investments in crude oil via the oil-producing firm ConocoPhillips (COP) 
valuation throughout the sample period (Figure 4.1 ). The positive relation is consistent with the 
hypothesis that long-run expectations about the present value of rents generated by oil production 
are positively related to oil prices. 
To test the hypothesis that the positive correlation between WTI and COP represents the 
effect of oil prices on the present value of rents generate by oil production, I estimate a model in 
which COP is replaced with the price of ExxonMobil stock (XOM) as traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Compared to ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil is less reliant on exploration and 
production (E&P)-it is a more vertically integrated company, which provides refining services, 
wholesale and retail distribution of finished products, etc. Also, ExxonMobil has a large presence 
in the natural gas market, which blurs the correlation of its valuation with the price of crude oil9 • 
Both of these differences suggest that the correlation between WTI and XOM should be weaker 
than the correlation between WTI and COP. Consistent with this hypothesis, the measured 
correlation between returns to XOM and WTI measured by the Kalman filter model is statistically 
insignificant throughout most of the sample period. The stronger correlation with ConocoPhillips 
implies that its correlation with WTI will eliminate the effect of market fundamentals from any 
correlation among returns to direct investments in oil, equity markets, and gold. 
After accounting for the effect of market fundamentals on oil prices, correlations remain 
between returns to WTI and returns to direct investments in a basket of equities, SP500, and gold, 
(Figure 4.1 ). As described below, the changing correlation between returns to equities and crude 
9 Since 2006, prices of crude oil and natural gas in the US decouple due to large increases in the 
production of natural gas. 
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oil are consistent with the financialization of the crude oil market, which I define as a change in 
the dominant source of returns, from convenience yields, which are derived from holding crude 
oil as a commodity to the expected appreciation of crude oil as a financial asset. 
The hypothesis that the main source of returns to crude oil changes from convenience yields 
to the expected appreciation of the asset is based on an interpretation of Figure 4. 1 relative to the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model equation (equation 4.1 0), which represents the expected rate of 
return on investments. The relation between returns to investments in crude oil and equity 
markets is given by the following: 
( 4.1 0) 
in which r0 ;1,1 is the rate of return on crude oil at time t, rF,t is the rate of return on risk-free 
investments, re,t is the rate of return in equity markets, such as the S&P 500, and fJ is the 
correlation between returns to crude oil and equities. Ad defined by the capital asset pricing 
model, f3 is akin to the correlation coefficients generated by the Kalman Filter model and the 
OLS regression coefficients estimated from rolling windows. 
Figure 4.1 indicates that there is a negative correlation between returns to investments in crude 
oil and the S&P 500 between 2003 and 2007. Without knowing the causal order between these 
variables, there are at least two possible explanations for the negative correlation. From an 
economic perspective, rising oil prices tend to slow economic activity (e.g. Hamilton 1983). As 
such, a period of steadily increasing oil prices could dampen the outlook for economic activity 
and hence the earnings of publicly traded firms. Although feasible, this explanation is not 
consistent with the changes in the levels of these two variables. Between 2003 and 2008, both oil 
prices and the S&P 500 rise rapidly (Figure 4.3). If the negative effect of rising oil prices 
dampens the outlook for economic activity, this effect would have to be very small because the 
S&P 500 rises strongly between 2003 and 2008. 
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Alternatively, the negative correlation between returns to WTI and S&P500 between 2003 
and 2008 may be generated by investments in crude oil as a hedge for investments in S&P 500 
(Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006). If either a macroeconomic expansion or a speculative bubble 
causes equity values to appreciate faster than oil prices, investors may hedge some of these gains 
by transferring funds from equities to commodities. Conversely, if oil prices appreciate faster 
than returns to the S&P 500, noncommercial traders may transfer some of their funds from 
commodities to equities. 
Beyond the negative correlation between returns to crude oil and the S&P 500, the absolute 
level of returns to investments in crude oil can be approximated by solving equation 4.1 0. During 
the 2003-2007 period, the value of fJ estimated by the Kalman filter model varies between -0.5 
and -1.5. If I use an average value of -1.0, and assume that the risk free rate of return is 3 percent 
(based on values of short-run interest rates) and long-run returns to the S&P500 are about 6 
percent, investments in crude oil have a return of about -3 percent. As such, this return lies along 
the security market line to the left of the origin in Figure 4.4. That is, investors recognize the 
value of diversification offered by WTl, and are willing to hold WTI even when the expected 
return to direct investments in crude oil is less than the risk free rate of interest. 
This negative rate of return is consistent with the yield curve for futures contracts for crude oil. 
For most of the 2003-2007 period, the difference between far month and near month contracts for 
crude oil generally is negative (Figure 4.5). In other words, backwardation in the crude oil 
market generates a negative return to holding physical quantities of crude oil. 
Backwardation in commodity markets is possible because convenience yields can create 
positive returns. For those who buy and sell crude oil as a commodity, the convenience yield is 
defined as an adjustment to the cost of carry in the non-arbitrage pricing formula for forward 
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prices in markets with trading constraints. According to this definition, convenience yield can be 
calculated from the following formula: 
( 4.11) 
in which C is convenience yield, F is the price for the futures contract for maturity T at time t, S 
is the spot price at time t, and T-t is the time till maturity for maturity t. Using this formula, 
convenience yields generally are positive during the 2003-2008 period. These positive values, 
along with the positive risk free rate of investment, may generate a small positive rate of return to 
those who hold crude oil as a commodity relative to the negative rate of return (given by the 
security market line in Figure 4.4) for those who hold crude oil as a financial asset. 
The negative and positive sources of returns to investments in crude oil are altered by the 2008 
financial crisis, which reduces the convenience yield, alters the yield curve for crude oil, and 
ultimately converts crude oil from a commodity to a financial asset. This change is signaled by a 
sharp rise in the correlation relation between returns to crude oil and equity markets, from 
strongly negative values in the third quarter of 2008 to strongly positive values that start in the 
first quarter of2009 and remain positive thereafter (Figures 4.1 & 4.2). 
The sharp change from a negative to positive correlation in the foutth quarter of 2008 
coincides with the Chapter II bankruptcy protection filing by Lehman Brothers (September 15) 
and the subsequent deepening of the financial crisis. The fourth quarter of 2008 is characterized 
by significant efforts by the U.S. Treasury to inject capital into financial markets, purchase ' toxic 
assets,' and force buyouts of large financial institutions (e.g. Merrill Lynch buyout by Bank of 
America and Wachovia's purchase by Citigroup). Although this chain of events is preceded by 
bailouts (e.g. Bear Stearns in March 2008 or the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July 
2008), the crisis deepens dramatically after Lehman Brothers files for Chapter II bankruptcy 
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protection. Many economists argue that the downfall of Lehman Brothers causes a market panic 
that generates a contagion in the entire financial system. In order to avoid such a panic, the US 
Federal Reserve pursues a lax monetary policy by lowering short-term interest rates nearly to 
zero. 
Lowering short term interest rates (re) shifts the security market line down and the concurrent 
decline in the demand for crude oil reduces convenience yields. Both of these changes reduce the 
financial attractiveness of crude oil as a commodity and emphasize crude oil as a financial asset. 
Specifically, the reduction in interest rates and increase in oil inventories (Figure 4.6) sharply 
reduce the convenience yield of crude oil. By the start of 2009, convenience yields for holding 
crude oil are nearly zero. This eliminates the advantages of holding crude oil as a commodity. 
With very small benefits of holding crude oil (due to low convenience yields) and the high 
cost of marginal physical storage (due in part to high inventory levels, see Figure 4.6), the spot 
price of crude oil drops relative to the futures price. Consistent with these changes, the crude oil 
market goes into contango during the first months of 2009 and remains there for the rest of the 
sample period (Figure 4.5). This long period of contango is relatively unprecedented in crude oil 
markets. 
The combination of contango and the reduction in short-term interest rates have the 
simultaneous effect of increasing the return to investments in crude oil as a financial asset. With 
the market in contango, positive returns are defined by the risk-free rate of interest and the 
positive slope ofthe yield curve for future contracts for crude oil. At the same time, the reduction 
in short term interest rates shifts the security markets line down to SML' (Figure 4.4). Both of 
these changes have the net effect of moving the returns to oil to the right side of the origin-it has 
positive returns net of convenience yields. Under these conditions, crude oil is a financial asset 
that has a positive relation with other financial assets, such as the equity markets. This positive 
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relationship is represented by the positive value for fJ for periods after the fourth quarter of 2008 
that are estimated by the Kalman Filter model and the OLS models estimated from rolling 
windows (Figure 4.1 & 4.2). 
4.5. Conclusion 
Using the time-varying Kalman filter, I find support for the finding of a regime change in the 
equity-oil market cross-correlations described in the existing literature (BUyUk~ahin and Robe, 
2011; Tang and Xiong, 2011; UNCTAD, 2011; Bicchetti and Maystre, 2012; EIA, 2012). The 
Kalman filter results are roughly equivalent to 1-year rolling window regressions, though the 
former methodology provides an optimal degree of coefficient persistence that does not rely on 
the arbitrary choice of window width. I find that the past decade is characterized by two distinct 
regimes- one predominantly driven by market fundamentals (2004-2008:Q3) and one dominated 
by speculation and portfolio rebalancing (2008:Q4-20 II). These results make sense from a 
financial theory point of view, as evidenced by the convenience yield and Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) analysis. The positive equity-oil market cross correlations in 2008:Q4-2011 are 
consistent with low interest rates and high oil inventories, and the resulting oil futures market 
contango. Considering the timing of this regime change, the switch from a market fundamentals-
driven regime (in which oil could be considered a commodity) to a financialized regime (in which 
oil is, on the net, an asset) need not imply any malevolent speculation, but rather portfolio 
rebalancing following the collapse of the real estate bubble and the ensuing recession. The 
unprecedented, near-zero interest rate levels, combined with recession-induced crude oil 
inventory build-up, depressed convenience yields, i.e. the gains from holding oil as a commodity. 
The net result of this change was the relative increase in value of holding oil as a financial asset. 
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Figure 4.1. Kalman filter point estimates 















Figure 4.2. Rolling window regression estimates 
Rolling regressions, dependent variable = WTI 
point estimates 
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This dissertation examines the quantitative and qualitative importance of speculation and 
fundamentals in the oil price discovery process. With regard to economic fundamentals, my 
research corroborates the long-standing literature on the relative importance of oil supply shocks 
(e.g. Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Mork et al. , 1994; Cufiado and Perez de 
Garcia, 2003 ; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005) and undermines evidence for the relative 
importance of demand shocks. Specifically, I find that alternative, more econometrically 
appropriate specifications of Kilian ' s (2009) model, along with an alternative choice of variables 
(e.g. FOB price of oil instead of refiner' s acquisition cost, and disaggregating global supply into 
OPEC and non-OPEC supply streams) lead to results that are inconsistent with Kilian ' s findings . 
In other words, Kilian' s econometric support for the theoretical arguments found in the recent oil 
demand literature (Barsky and Kilian, 2002, 2004; Hamilton, 2003 ; Rotemberg, 2007) are not 
robust to alternative, arguably superior model specifications. 
That said, I do provide additional support for the prevalent, rich oil supply shock 
literature. This is not to deny the originality of the present work. To the contrary, by examining 
Kilian's dataset, I explicitly model aggregate and oil-market-specific precautionary demand, 
thereby doing away with the assumption implicit in the earlier literature that all oil price changes 
are due to supply shocks, rather than to an interplay of supply and demand. Kilian ' s argument that 
one needs to simultaneously model supply and demand is well-taken, however his empirical 
findings are inconsistent with a proper econometric specification and variable selection. The use 
of the co integrated vector autoregression (CV AR) instead of a standard V AR is noteworthy - in 
the presence of unit roots and cointegration, the former model can capture the long-run 
equilibrium, short-run adjustments towards the equilibrium, and can verifY cointegration, thereby 
guarding against spurious regressions (Juselius, 2006). 
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At the same time, I would like to underscore that this research is by no means conclusive 
- Kilian's set of conditioning variables is limited, and a richer information set could lead to 
different conclusions. Also, I find that Kilian's dry cargo shipping index is a poor proxy for 
aggregate demand, and is relevant in Kilian ' s model mostly due to the oil price mark-up 
associated with shipping costs. Therefore, my invalidation of Kilian ' s findings via the use of a 
shipping-cost-free oil price measure (FOB price) simply weakens his oil demand argument by 
pointing out the issue of a poor demand proxy, but it does not resolve the problem by using a 
better conditioning variable, because global monthly aggregate demand data are simply not 
available. Although clever, Kilian ' s index for dry cargo bulk freight costs is is not a good 
correlate of global aggregate demand, and my model re-specification confirms this line of 
reasoning. It would be a mistake to conclude that oil demand is much less important relative to 
supply in terms of driving the oil price formation process and the macroeconomic outcomes 
associated with oil price changes. My findings simply point out the need for further research 
given the availability of better cotTelates of the market drivers in question . 
In addition to providing empirical findings , my economic fundamentals-related research 
raises several important questions. First, even if 1 had a good proxy for aggregate demand (e.g. a 
monthly measure of PPP-adjusted gross world product), the question remains as to what a 
demand shock would actually entail. Oil is not consumed in isolation, it is used by capital 
equipment. Because the total capital stock changes little from year to year, and an increase the in 
capital utilization rate simply returns the economy back towards a secular trend following a 
recession, it would be hard to make the case for an abrupt, positive demand shock - unless the 
economy grows at a rate wildly exceeding expectations via extraordinarily high rates of 
investment. Also, considering the discussions surrounding the 2004-2008 increase in the price of 
oil found in both the scientific literature and in the popular press, one should note that global 
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economic growth in general, and oil demand growth in particular, were considerably below the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration's forecasts. Of course, observed oil consumption is not 
equivalent to unobserved oil demand, and demand could grow sharply even as consumption 
changes little. If that were the case, it would imply that the income elasticity of oil demand is 
considerably less than the own-price elasticity of oil demand, which is inconsistent with the 
evidence. 
The results of my oil market fundamentals-related research are roughly consistent with 
the importance of oil supply shocks. As described by the existing literature, price-taking non-
OPEC nations use criteria different from those used by OPEC nations. And the criteria used by 
OPEC are not included in the CV AR, as indicated by the finding that OPEC production is 
exogenous. Furthermore, OPEC decisions have a long-run relation with oil pnces, which is 
consistent with previous efforts to identify the effect of OPEC production on price (e.g. Gately et 
al., 1977; Kaufmann et al., 2004; Kaufmann et al., 2008; Chevillon and Riftlart, 2009). Together, 
these effects are consistent with the importance of both the positive price effects of OPEC supply 
shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s and negative price effects of the OPEC supply shocks in the 
mid-1980s. 
With respect to the speculative (non-commercial traders) or fundamentals-driven 
(commercial traders) influence of trader positions on oil prices, my CVAR models identify a 
long-run (cointegrating) relation between trader positions and oil prices. Furthermore, o il prices 
error-correct to the disequilibrium. This means that trader positions Granger-cause oil prices, 
which stands in contrast with simple, bivariate Granger causality based on VARs (Sanders et al. , 
2004; ITF, 2008; Biiyiik~ahin and Harris 2011). The cointegration and error-correction-permitting 
nature of the CVAR, combined with a richer set of conditioning variables (disaggregated 
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commercial and non-commercial short and long trader positions, oil inventories, and spot and 
futures prices) probably reduce or eliminate the omitted variable bias present in bivariate Granger 
causality models. The CV AR is specifically designed to handle non-stationary time series that are 
cointegrated, so this multiple-cointegrating-vector framework is better suited than a simple V AR. 
Compared to a VECM, the CV AR allows many co integrating vectors, each with their individual 
loadings and speeds of adjustment, while a VECM only allows a single cointegrating relation in 
each equation, along with its speed-of-adjustment parameter. The restrictive nature of a VECM 
could have generates different results, and in any case would not have been as informative as a 
model that allows for several long-run relations that can be restricted in a way that they are both 
statistically significant and interpretable from an economic and financial theory point of view. 
In addition to finding a long-run equilibrium relation between trader positions and oil 
prices to which oil prices error correct, I find that this disequilibrium has a short-run effect on oil 
prices, with the direction of causality going from trader positions to oil prices. Again, this 
conclusion differs from that generated by previous, bivariate Granger causality research based on 
VARs. My research also finds that there exist long-run equilibria among trader positions within 
and between categories of trader positions, and that these additional long-run equilibria are 
limited to trader positions. For instance, it is pretty common to find a long-run relation between 
non-commercial short and long positions - this makes sense from a theoretical standpoint, since 
in the long run, the market cannot be long or short on the net. The presence of these long-run 
relations not only confirms basic financial principles, but it also separates this effect from other 
long-run relations of interest, which would not be possible in a simple VECM, in which the single 
cointegrating relation is a linear combination of separate CVAR cointegrating relations (the latter 
lends itself to an economic interpretation, while the former often does not). 
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Finally, my research finds that oil prices also have a short-run effect on trader positions. 
Both commercial and non-commercial traders react to oil price changes in a way that is consistent 
with positive feedback trading. Together with the classification of oil prices as endogenous or 
exogenous (spot or futures prices are respectively endogenous or exogenous, depending on the 
model) these findincrs suo-crest a mechanism by which changes in trader positions can have a 
' 0 00 
significant effect on oil prices. 
Lastly, my research identifies cross-commodity and equity-to-commodity market 
financial flows, which can be thought of as a portfolio rebalancing adjustment mechanism. The 
relationship between spot oil prices, commodity prices (as proxied by gold), equity valuation 
(S&PSOO index) and oil market fundamentals (proxied by the price ofthe ConocoPhillips stock) 
changes significantly over time. Due to the arbitrary nature of rolling-window size selection in 
the case of rolling regressions, I use the Kalman filter which chooses an optimal stochastic 
evolution of the regression coefficients by choosing state and measurement equation variances to 
maximize the likelihood function. Interestingly, these results look strikingly similar to a 250-
trading day rolling-window regression, though the Kalman filter estimates are preferred on 
theoretical econometric grounds. My research finds that the fourth quarter of 2008 marks a 
regime change in the relationships between the variables - the oil-equity relationship changes 
from one in which oil is valued primarily as a commodity (2004-2008:Q3) to one in which it is 
valued on the net as a financial asset (2008:Q4-present). Also, the partial correlation between oi l 
and gold prices becomes large, statistically significant and positive after 2008:Q3, which 
probably suggests an increased general interest in commodity investments that follow the declines 
in the equity market and a decline in convenience yields. The presence of strong statistically 
significant correlations between oil prices, equity prices, the prices of other commodities (proxied 
by gold), and an oil company stock price (proxy for oil market fundamentals) suggests that both 
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speculation (or at least pure financial flows) and fundamentals play a role in the price formation 
process between 1997 and 2011 , although these correlations only became statistically significant 
in 2004 and they did not experience a regime change until the fall of 2008, which marks the 
intensification of the mortgage-related financial crisis and the associated global recession. 
What are the policy implications of this research? With regard to economic fundamentals, 
my dissertation shows that the importance of oil supply shocks is consistent with the previous 
literature. To the extent that these disruptions are caused by wars (e.g. the Iraq War), natural 
disasters (e.g. hurricane Katrina), OPEC production quota decisions (e.g. the 1973-74 embargo) 
or other exogenous factors, private, profit-maximizing decisions by oil distributors may not be 
sufficient to maximize the social benefit due to the macroeconomic consequences of such 
disruptions. In this sense, an emergency stockpile such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) 
operated by the U.S. Department of Energy makes sense, although the size of the reserve that 
would be optimal would be hard to estimate, because the econometrically determined market 
response to a disruption of a given size only constitutes part of the picture. The macroeconomic 
response depends on the size of the shock, however the shock of a given size has an unknown 
probability of occurrence. Looking at the past volatility (in the GARCH sense) is not informative 
when one is dealing with unpredictable events such as wars. Nevertheless, even though the 
optimal size of the stockpile cannot be easily determined, the SPR does make sense from the 
supply shock point of view. 
My revisiting of Kilian ' s (2009) research did not undermine the argument for the 
importance of aggregate demand shocks - I only pointed out that Kilian does not use a good 
proxy for aggregate demand. Thus, more research is needed once better aggregate demand proxy 
data become available. However, at a thought experiment level, I can still reach some policy 
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conclusions. First, one need not worry about negative demand shocks, because they would cause 
a decrease in price. Such a decrease would stimulate the economy, although the asymmetry of the 
economic response to price decreases relative to price increases indicates that this response would 
be small in any case (Darby, 1982; Hamilton, 1988; Mork, 1989; Bohi, 1991, Mork et al., 1994; 
Lee et al., 1995). As far as positive demand shocks are concerned, it needs to be noted that they 
can only stem from a movement of the economy towards full potential, since investment only 
induces gradual changes in the energy-using capital stock. Oil producers should be able to 
accommodate the movement of the global economy towards its potential output, so positive 
demand shocks should not in principle cause large price changes. Even if the economy moves 
towards potential output, i.e. above its secular trend which is characterized by a less than 
maximum capital utilization, such a temporary boom would be tempered by higher oil prices in a 
self-correcting way. Therefore, even at a theoretical level, positive aggregate demand shocks 
should not have considerable recessionary effects. 
On the speculation side, one needs to distinguish between the oil futures market-specific 
speculation and the equity-oil market capital flows. My research indicates that futures market-
specific speculation shows potential for speculative bubbles, which indicates that prices could 
move away from market fundamentals, and such disequilibria could have social costs that could 
outweigh the benefits reaped by ·the market participants. This could call for government 
intervention if these bubbles generate a net social cost after accounting for the benefit to 
speculators, in other words, if the bubbles are not Pareto optimal. Such a determination would 
involve a detailed analysis that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. As far as equity-oil 
market capital flows are concerned, my research indicates that these flows are consistent with the 
predictions of the capital asset pricing model , and are therefore efficient. What my findings 
suggest is that the expansionary monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve to save the 
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financial system following the financial crisis in the fall of 2008 had an unintended consequence 
of driving convenience yields to zero, and thereby causing a regime change of the returns from oil 
changing from commodity-driven returns (convenience yields) to purely financial returns (futures 
market contango). Therefore, in future recession-fighting efforts, the Fed will need to weigh the 
benefits of an expansionary monetary policy against the costs of financializing nonperishable 
commodity markets in general, and the oil market in particular. Considering that an expansionary 
fiscal policy raises interest rates while raising aggregate demand while an expansionary monetary 
policy lowers interest rates while increasing demand, an expansionary fiscal policy would not 
have the side effect offinancializing the oil market that an expansionary monetary policy had in 
the 2008 financial crisis mitigation efforts. 
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